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Abstract - English
For a couple of years the subject of income (in)equality has moved into the focus
of numerously scientific articles. Most empiric studies confirm, that income dis-
parities have grown considerably in the past decades in industrial states. Many
newspaper articles are as well dealing with the widening of income gaps, as for ex-
ample a contribution of the Economist:”[O]ver the past quarter century, those at
the top have done better than those in the middle, who in turn have outpaced those
at the bottom. The gains of productivity growth have been increasingly skewed.”
(The Economist: Inequality in America – The rich, the poor and the growing gap
between them, 25.07.2006). The results of several empiric studies support these
statements (cp. Piketty/Saez 2004, Bach/Corneo/Steiner 2007 or Guger/
Marterbauer 2007). Besides, it seems hardly surprising that this development
particularly affects migrants, since this layer of society could often not enforce its
economic interests.
The intention of this thesis is to determine the causes of the persistently high
income differences between migrants and Austrians and to fathom the reasons for
different payment. The income gap will be split up in its single components by
means of the decomposition model which was developed by Blinder (1973) and
Oaxaca (1973). Starting point for the earnings model is a regression on a row
of variables from the data set EU-SILC (European Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions) of 2005. Typical characteristics for the determination of wage levels are
amongst others the level of education, labor market experience, gender, firm size,
industrial sector, etc.
A remarkable fact which is observable is, that migrants with similar or even the
same level of education as Austrians still do not receive the same payments of wages.
In the calculations, this can be shown by differences in the coefficients despite similar
or the same endowments and is familiar as discrimination in common economic
literature.
In this paper, theoretical perceptions of different economic schools are underlying
the econometric calculations. Beside the popular approach of Gary S. Becker (cp.
Becker 1971), a historical approach to the origin of economic discrimination is
introduced, concerning the central question under which economic and social con-
ditions inequality generally may appear. The sociological concept of the industrial
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reserve army (cp. Marx 1977) is as well picked up for the characterization of the
migrant working population. According to Biffl (2002) migrants in low wage sec-
tors are primarly concerned by job layoffs in times of economic downturn, which
leads to a decrease in wage differentials, since those workers are omitted from the
statistics who previously marked the bottom of the income distribution. The like-
lihood to be occupied for one additional year is clearly lower for migrants than for
Austrians.
The disproportionate frequency of migrants employed in low wage sectors has
its roots in the Austrian education system. Migrants often do not even possess a
graduation in compulsory education (5.1% from fm. Yugoslavia, 5.9% from Turkey
and 0.6% from Austrian), on the other hand they more often own a university
degree (5.5% of all alien residents in Austria aged older 15, compared to only 4.2%
of Austrians). However, these are basically migrants from the old EU-15 states, who
represent the top in the educational system.
In 1999, two thirds of all workers with migration background were concentrated
on six industrial branches: Building and construction industry, tourism, wholesale
and retail trade, corporate-orientated services, production and processing of metals
and finally traffic and communication (cp. Biffl 2002). This concentration on
low wage branches explains a large part of the income disparities between migrants
and Austrians. Therefore, full time workers from former Yugoslavia, Turkey and
the ten new EU members only earn about 78.9% of the incomes of their Austrian
counterparts. In this thesis, about 39% of the wage differential can be explained by
different endowments (education, labor market experience, etc.). The unexplained
part of the income differential amounts therefore to 61% and can be assigned partly
to lacking information in the model and partly to pure discrimination in the labor
market.
Moreover, the twofold economic burden of female migrants is picked out, since
female foreigners are affected on the one hand by the gender wage gap and, on the
other hand, by the ethnic wage gap. Accordingly, female workers from Yugoslavia,
Turkey and the new EU states form the bottom of the income distribution. Fi-
nally, some widespread policy measures for the containment of discrimination are
discussed. However, problems of insufficiency of these proposals are highlighted as
well.
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Abstract - Deutsch
Seit einigen Jahren ru¨ckt das Thema der Einkommens(ungleich)verteilung wieder
in den Fokus zahlreicher wissenschaftlicher Studien. Die meisten empirischen Ar-
beiten besta¨tigen, dass sich die Einkommensunterschiede in den Industriestaaten
in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten vergro¨ßert haben. Der O¨ffnung der Einkommens-
schere wird auch auf medialer Ebene versta¨rkt Raum gewidmet, wie zum Beispiel
in einem Beitrag des Economist: ”[O]ver the past quarter century, those at the
top have done better than those in the middle, who in turn have outpaced those at
the bottom. The gains of productivity growth have been increasingly skewed.” (The
Economist: Inequality in America – The rich, the poor and the growing gap be-
tween them, 25.07.2006). Die Ergebnisse zahlreicher empirischer Studien belegen
diese Aussagen (vgl. Piketty/Saez 2004, Bach/Corneo/Steiner 2007 oder
Guger/Marterbauer 2007). Dabei erscheint es kaum verwunderlich, dass sich
diese Entwicklung ganz besonders auf MigrantInnen negativ auswirkt, insofern als
diese Gesellschaftsgruppe ihre Interessen besonders schwer durchsetzen konnte.
Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit ist es, die Ursachen der anhaltend hohen Einkommensun-
terschiede zwischen MigrantInnen und O¨sterreicherInnen zu ermitteln und der Frage
nachzugehen, welche Gru¨nde fu¨r die unterschiedliche Bezahlung zu nennen sind.
Dabei sollen die Einkommensunterschiede mit Hilfe des Dekompositionsmodells von
Blinder (1973) und Oaxaca (1973) in ihre einzelnen Komponenten zerlegt wer-
den. Ausgangspunkt fu¨r das ist eine Regression u¨ber eine Reihe von Variablen aus
dem sogenannten EU-SILC (European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions)
des Jahres 2005. Die typischen Charakteristika fu¨r die Bestimmung der Lohnho¨he
sind unter anderem Ausbildungsniveau, Berufserfahrung, Geschlecht, Betriebsgro¨ße,
Branche und einige mehr.
Es ist beobachtbar, dass MigrantInnen mit a¨hnlichen oder denselben Ausbil-
dungsmerkmalen wie O¨sterreicherInnen dennoch nicht dieselben Lohnauszahlungen
erhalten. Dies dru¨ckt sich in der Regression durch Unterschiede in den Koeffizien-
ten bei gleichen Eigenschaftsmatrizen aus und wird in der o¨konomischen Literatur
gemeinhin als Diskriminierung verstanden.
Den o¨konometrischen Berechnungen liegen in dieser Arbeit theoretische Konzepte
verschiedener wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Denkschulen zu Grunde. Neben dem
weithin bekannten und verbreiteten Ansatz von Gary S. Becker (vgl. Becker 1971)
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wird auch ein historischer Ansatz u¨ber die Entstehung von o¨konomischer Diskri-
minierung versucht, mit der zentralen Frage unter welchen Bedingungen Diskri-
minierung u¨berhaupt auftreten kann. Auch der soziologische Begriff der indus-
triellen Reservearmee (vgl. Marx 1977) wird fu¨r die Charakterisierung der mi-
grantischen Arbeitsbevo¨lkerung herangezogen. Laut Biffl (2002) sind in Zeiten
der konjunkturellen Abku¨hlung prima¨r MigrantInnen aus Niedriglohnbranchen von
Arbeitsplatzabbau betroffen, was dazu fu¨hrt dass das Lohndifferential zu Einhei-
mischen schrumpft, da jene Personen aus der Statistik fallen, die zuvor das untere
Ende der Einkommensverteilung markiert haben. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, ein weit-
eres Jahr bescha¨ftigt zu sein, ist fu¨r MigrantInnen ohnedies deutlich geringer.
Die u¨berproportionale Bescha¨ftigung in Niedriglohnbranchen hat ihre Wurzeln im
o¨sterreichischen Bildungssystem. ZuwanderInnen haben ha¨ufiger keinen Pflichtschul-
abschluss (5,1% aus dem ehem. Jugoslawien, 5,9% aus der Tu¨rkei und 0,6% der
O¨sterreicherInnen), dafu¨r aber ha¨ufiger einen Hochschulabschluss (5,5% aller in
O¨sterreich wohnhaften Ausla¨nderInnen u¨ber 15 Jahren gegenu¨ber 4,2% der O¨ster-
reicherInnen). Vor allem sind es aber MigrantInnen aus den alten EU-15-Staaten,
die am oberen Ende der Bildungsspanne zu finden sind.
1999 waren zwei Drittel aller Arbeitskra¨fte mit Migrationshintergrund auf sechs
Branchen konzentriert: Bauwirtschaft, Tourismus, Handel einschließlich Reparatur-
wesen, unternehmensorientierte Dienstleistungen, Erzeugung und Verarbeitung von
Metallen sowie Verkehr und Nachrichtenu¨bermittlung (vgl. Biffl 2002). Diese
Konzentration auf Niedriglohnbranchen erkla¨rt einen Großteil der Einkommens-
schere zwischen MigrantInnen und O¨sterreicherInnen. Demnach verdienen Men-
schen aus dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien, der Tu¨rkei und der zehn neuen EU-Staaten
im Median nur rund 78,9% der Einkommen von O¨sterreicherInnen. In dieser Arbeit
ko¨nnen rund 39% des Lohndifferentials durch unterschiedliche Auspra¨gungen (Aus-
bildung, Berufserfahrung, usw.) erkla¨rt werden. Der unerkla¨rte Teil der Einkom-
mensunterschiede betra¨gt somit 61% und kann teils mangelnden Informationen im
Modell und teils reiner Diskriminierung am Arbeitsmarkt zugerechnet werden.
Daru¨berhinaus wird die doppelte o¨konomische Belastung von Migrantinnen the-
matisiert, die einerseits vom gender wage gap und andererseits vom ethnic wage
gap betroffen sind. Dementsprechend finden sich Arbeiterinnen aus Jugoslawien,
der Tu¨rkei und den neuen EU-Staaten am unteren Ende der Einkommensspanne.
Am Ende der Arbeit werden einige verbreitete Maßnahmen zur Einda¨mmung der
Diskriminierung diskutiert, jedoch auch Probleme der Unzula¨nglichkeit aufgezeigt.
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1. Introduction
Since wage disparities are steadily growing, the analysis of income distributions has
gained in importance in the last decades. There are several studies and expert
groups (such as Canberra Group 2001) that observe a continuously increase of
income inequality. Piketty/Saez (2004) analyze the evolution of top incomes in
the course of the whole past century in the USA. In a very interesting article the
authors show that the pattern of the top decile share is U-shaped. This means that
the share of the top ten percent fluctuated around 40 to 45% of total income before
the Second World War ended, declined substantially to some 30% in the post-war
period and finally increased dramatically in the last 25 years close to the pre-war
level. The top percentile in the US income distribution accounted for nearly 17% of
all incomes in 2000. Further, they show similar developments in the United Kingdom
and in Canada. According to Piketty and Saez, income concentration has definitely
risen in the last decades.
Bach/Corneo/Steiner (2007) explore the personal as well as the functional
income distribution in Germany between 1992 and 2001. According to the authors all
equality measures point out, that the situation is worsening. Looking at the 0.001%
top fractile of the distribution - which could be denoted as the economic elite in
Germany - a triplication of the group’s share in overall incomes can be noticed in
these nine years. Guger/Marterbauer (2007) describe the long-term evolution
of the Austrian income distribution. The authors observe growing inequality in the
employed population. While the income share of the lowest quintile decreased from
4.5% in 1976 to 2.2% in 2005, the top quintile could extend its share from 41.2% to
46.5%.
All of the referred research indicate an increasing wage inclination especially since
the 1980ies. The process of reallocation of incomes reflects a heightened exploitation
of labor force while top incomes are still boosting. Moreover, growing unemployment
rates weaken the bargaining position of unions in wage negotiations (cp. Guger/
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Marterbauer 2007, p. 17). Women and immigrants are seen as particularly af-
fected by growing income disparity, since their bargaining position was especially
weak.
Studies on wages and immigration haven’t really been of interest over a long
period of economic history. There are some exceptions especially in the United
States, for example some early state labor surveys that resulted in the Dillingham
Immigration Commission Report1 or a couple of early articles like that of Douglas
(1919). However, as Chiswick (1978) observes, the field was primarily of interest
to sociologists and historians.
On the 17th of October 2007 the Austrian newspaper Kurier 2 published an article
on wage differentials between immigrant and native workers in Austrian, based on
a study of the Arbeiterkammer Austria. It stated that the average gross income of
a male Austrian worker amounts to 1,900 Euros monthly (14 times p.a.) followed
by workers from former Yugoslavia (1,750), Germany and Turkey (1,650), Hungary
(1,540), Czech Republic and Slovakia (1,460). Hence, the average wage of Slovakians
only reaches 78% of the Austrian wage. The analysis indicated that foreign workers
are over-represented in low paid jobs, partly because they are misjudged in skills.
Another newspaper report from Die Presse3 stated that immigrants are rarely well
educated, more often unemployed and hardly have any opportunities for advance-
ment.
The topicality of this debate is unbroken and undoubtedly immigration played
an important role in Austrian history. The objective of this work is to deepen the
analysis of wage differentials in Austria, as has been done for a few other European
countries, like in Germany by Lang (2000), Switzerland by Golder (2000), Sweden
by Nordin/Rooth (2007) or Great Britain by Denny/Harmon/Roche (1997).
The special attention is paid to the different forms of economic discrimination which
cause large parts of the disparities in monetary labor compensation.
In Chapter 2, a historical framework of immigration in Austria should offer a
proper introduction into the topic. Further, various theories on economic discrim-
1The Dillingham Immigration Commission was formed in the light of growing political concern
about immigration in the United States. In 1911 the Commission published a 41-volume report,
that can be viewed at http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/themes-dillingham.html [last
visit: May 2009]
2Kurier : Ausla¨ndische Arbeiter verdienen weniger, online published on 17.10.2007
3Die Presse: EU scheitert bei Migranten-Integration, published on 13.09.2008
2
ination are elaborated in Chapter 3, followed by Section 4 on segregation and as-
similation. Next, the dataset and the statistical methods which are used, will be
explained in Chapters 5 and 6. Thereafter the whole theoretical structure will be
applied on the data provided by the EU-SILC 2005 in Section 7. Finally, various
anti-discrimination policies and perspectives for the future are briefly presented in
Chapter 8.
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2. Immigration in Austria: A
historical Introduction
Ich bin grundsa¨tzlich der Meinung, dass die O¨konomie ohne Geschichte
ein steuerloses Schiff ist und O¨konomen ohne Geschichte keine genaue
Vorstellung davon haben, wo dieses Schiff hinfa¨hrt. (Eric Hobsbawm,
cited in Matis/Senft 2007, p. 45)
This chapter intends to offer a short history of working immigration in
Austria, actual demographic figures and an overview on the labor market
performance of foreigners. Moreover the development of migration after
the EU-enlargement of 2004 is analyzed. The focus is especially on the
typical immigration countries, like former Yugoslavia and Turkey.
Like most European countries, Austria participated in the huge economic boom
after the second world war, when annual real GDP growth reached 4.7 percent
between 1960 and 1970 and the unemployment rate dropped below two percent (cp.
Schulmeister 2005, p. 5). These developments, combined with low birth-rates of
the early 1950ies and the emigration of Austrians towards western states created a
huge demand for workers which exceeded the domestic supply. Therefore workers
from countries with weak economic performance, like former Yugoslavia or Turkey,
were hired to leave their countries for a couple of months. This was the beginning
of a very peculiar form of migration in Post-War-Europe, which soon differed from
the original vision which was to recruit foreign workers by demand and replace them
arbitrarily4.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relation between economic growth and immigration in
Austria since 1971. The variance, beginning in the 1980ies, shows evidence that eco-
4For a detailed history of immigration in Austria, see Bauer (2008) or Herzog-Punzenberger
(2003).
4
Figure 2.1.: GDP-Growth and Immigration in Austria (1971=100)
* Total growth of Non-Austrian population
** Growth of Austrian population contributed by Eastern countries: Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, former Soviet Union, Czech Re-
public, Poland, Romania, Turkey and Hungary
(Source: Statistik Austria: Census 1951-2001, OECD Factbook 2007, own calculations)
nomic performance and immigration grew apart, indicating the discrepancy between
vision and reality. Before analyzing the labor market disparities among immigrant
and indigenous workers it seems useful to sum up the history of Austrian working
immigration just to get a perception of the topicality of this debate.
2.1. Historical Framework of Austrian Immigration
On the 19th of December 1925 the conservative government passed article 457 which
should guarantee domestic workers to receive jobs by complicating statutorily the
offer of jobs to immigrants.
§2. (1) Kein Arbeitgeber darf ohne beho¨rdliche Bewilligung einen Ar-
beiter, Angestellten, Hausgehilfen oder Lehrling bescha¨ftigen, der nicht
o¨sterreichischer Bundesbu¨rger ist oder sich nicht seit mindestens 1. Ja¨nner
1923 im Bundesgebiet aufha¨lt.(Bundesgesetzblatt 1925, p. 1964)
§7. (1) Die Bewilligung darf nur erteilt werden, wenn es die Lage des Ar-
beitsmarktes zula¨sst, wenn wichtige Interessen der Volkswirtschaft es er-
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fordern oder wenn sonstige triftige Gru¨nde, insbesondere wichtige Fami-
lienru¨cksichten oder Gru¨nde der Menschlichkeit dafu¨r sprechen.
(Bundesgesetzblatt 1925, p. 1965)
The notable fact is that this discriminating law was obtained until 1961 even
though the first migration wave started in 1960. From 1960 to 1968 the annual
average immigration can be amounted to 6,393 persons. At the end of the year
1961 the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Austria, Julius Raab and the
chairman of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, Franz Olah, concluded their
famous ”Raab-Olah-Agreement”. They fixed the number of immigrants on 47,000,
for whom companies had not to prove that there existed indigenous supply for these
working places, according to article 457.
Needless to say that in the case of economic downturn they could be sent back
to their home countries. The Chamber of Commerce built up recruitment centers
in foreign countries to find labor force especially for this purpose. In 1962 the first
bilateral immigration-agreement between Austria and Spain was passed, followed by
contracts with Turkey in 1964 and Yugoslavia in 1966. The first peak of immigration
was reached between 1969 and 1973 when on average 23,498 people moved in per year
based on excellent economic conditions in this boom phase. Due to the economic
stagnation after the oil price shock in 1973 the recruitment of foreign labor force was
stopped but the failure of the concept of working ”guests” was noticeable, since most
of the immigrant workers stayed in Austria. As a consequence, a law regulating the
permission of immigrant workers to the Austrian labor market was passed in 1976.
The quintessence of this law was that foreign workers were just allowed to work, if
the situation in the labor market as well as the public agenda were in favor of these
activities. Since then, the size of immigration was determined annually.
The second peak of immigration between 1989 and 1993 topped the first one with
approximately triple figures. In these years the average annual growth was 67,610
immigrants. In contrast to the first waves of immigration, which were stimulated
by pull-factors of the demand side (i.e. Austria), this wave was rather incited by
pushing factors as the opening of Eastern Europe, the collapse of Yugoslavia or the
reunion of Germany. These political incidents in the supply countries were followed
by the desire for higher wages and more stable political conditions and pushed
immigration. While in the 1960ies and 70ies demand was regulating the foreign
labor force potential in Austria, in the 80ies and 90ies increasing supply created
demand, especially for cheap and highly flexible labor force.
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As a consequence, in 1993 two further laws were passed, again regulating the
quota of immigration but two years later Austria joined the European Union and the
European Community. Thenceforward equal residence and employment regulations
were applied for Austrian citizens and employees from member-states of the EU.
However the limitations of workers beyond EU-borders were still defined by the
law of 1976 and -for example- amounted to 267,586 in the year 2002 which were
about 8 per cent of the Austrian employment potential. In addition up to 8,000
immigrants for seasonal employment (6 months) and further 7,000 for harvesting in
the agricultural sector were admitted. Since 2003 seasonal workers may be employed
in the same service two times in series for six months and every economic sector is
permitted to hire seasonal labor force.
Table 2.1.: Census by Nationality from 1951 to 2007
Nationality 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007
Germany 23,667 43,944 47,087 40,987 57,310 72,218 113,668
fm. Yugosl. 14,948 4,565 93,337 125,890 197,886 322,261 303,999
Czech Rep.1 4,754 741 2,991 2,032 11,318 7,313 8,277
Poland 3,705 539 774 5,911 18,321 21,841 34,676
Romania 2,798 262 397 1,253 18,536 17,470 23,048
Turkey 112 217 16,423 59,900 118,579 127,226 108,808
Hungary 5,985 4,956 2,691 2,526 10,556 12,729 18,135
Europe, other 19,455 19,925 23,099 22,209 34,507 54,172 ***
Europe, total 75,424 75,149 186,799 260,708 467,013 642,969 717,894
Africa 29 626 1,279 3,127 8,515 14,223 20,897
Asia 294 1,630 4,254 12,304 25,677 34,978 54,855
America 788 2,717 6,000 6,305 9,516 12,313 16,898
Australia 9 99 570 555 738 1,026 1,310
unknown 246,054 21,938 12,994 8,449 6,231 5,417 4,674
Austrian 6,611,307 6,971,648 7,279,630 7,263,890 7,278,096 7,322,000 7,472,910
Non-Austrian 322,598 102,159 211,896 291,448 517,690 710,926 826,013
Total 6,933,905 7,073,807 7,491,526 7,555,338 7,795,786 8,032,926 8,298,923
% Immigrant 4.70 1.40 2.80 3.90 6.60 8.90 9.95
1 Figures between 1951 and 1991 for Czechoslovakia; since 2001 only Czech Republic (without Slovakia)
(Source: Statisitk Austria, Census 1951- 2001; Population data 2007)
Prskawetz (1997) defines seven waves of immigration since 1960. The work-
ing migration in the 60ies and 70ies can be divided in (1) the early stage from
1961-68 (annual immigration balance of +6,393 persons), (2) the peak from 1969-
73 (+23,498) and (3) the later stage from 1974-76, where there was a downsizing
of immigration (-11,109). After a (4) transitional period between 1977 and 1984
(+3,678) the next big wave of the 80ies started with the (5) early stage from 1985-
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1988 (+12,392). The (6) peak was between 1989 and 1993 (+67,610) and ended
with the (7) later stage from 1994 to 1995 (+10,273).
2.2. Immigration and Participation rates
If we just want to get a rough perception of working migration in Austria, we take a
look at the Austrian census from 1951 to 2001 in Table 2.1. Out of these figures the
growth rates of the Austrian population can be calculated as about 0.2 percent per
year whereas the Non-Austrian population grew annually approximately 1.6 percent
from 1951 to 2001.
Table 2.2.: Annual growth rates of population
by nationalities from 1951-2001
Nationality 1951-2001 1951-1981 1981-2001
Germany 2.2563 1.8474 2.8727
fm. Yugoslavia 6.3341 7.3611 4.8120
Czech Rep. 2.3318 -2.7935 10.5309
Poland 3.6119 1.5693 6.7531
Romania 3.7311 -2.6423 14.0820
Turkey 15.1084 23.2935 3.8383
Hungary 1.5207 -2.8345 8.4222
(Source: Statisitk Austria, Census 1951-2001, own calculations)
To reveal where this population growth is derived from, one may take a closer look
at the growth rates of the typical immigration nationalities in Austria, as shown in
Table 2.2. The figures for Poland and Romania from 1971-2001 seem somewhat
biased because these countries started their growth from a very low level. Anyway
the growth rates for Turkey (15.1% annual growth between 1951 and 2001) and
former Yugoslavia (6.3% respectively) are remarkable, representing the two biggest
nationalities since the 1980ies, as can be seen in Figure 2.2.
Biffl (2002) states that not the whole immigration growth can be explained by
working migration and quite an important role was played by family reunions or
political and war refugees especially in the 1990ies and due to increasing economic
integration between Austria and the European Union as well as Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). But while the share of the foreign labor force supplied by EU (or
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EEC respectively) countries rose from 7% to 11% between 1980 and 2001, the share
of employees from CEE increased from 2% to 12%.
Figure 2.2.: Immigrant Population of the four most-contributing Countries in
2001
(Source: Statistik Austria: Census 1951-2001)
Migration is not influencing the work potential in a direct way but rather through
the rate of participation in the labor market, which includes the employed as well
as the unemployed. If we take a look at Austria’s overall labor-force participation
rate5 in Table 2.3 we may notice, that the rate for foreigners is much higher than
that for natives since the census of 1971.
Following Prskawetz (1997, p. 7) the very high participation rate of foreigners
in 1971 (65%) can be traced back to the early stage of immigration in the 60ies when
mainly young and single foreigners -both men and women- entered the Austrian labor
market. On the other hand, the participation rates for natives shrinked between the
years 1961 to 1971 due to the baby-boom of the 1960ies and the transition of the
baby-boom generation of 1900 into retirement. Between 1971 and 1981 the rate
of participation in the labor market decreased for foreigners, since this period is
considered to be the transitional period when many family reunions were taking
place. Hence the share of non-employed foreigners increased. In the 1980ies merely
younger people migrated to Austria increasing the participation rates from 48.8%
5Labor-force participation rates are accounted for all participants in the labor market as a share
of total population
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(1981) to 59% (1991) for 15-20 year old and from 65.7% (1981) to 74.2% (1991) for
20-25 year old workers. The overall participation rates reached 58,1% for immigrants
in 1991, which was the second highest rate since 1961. While 57.8% of the foreigners
were employed in 2001, this was only true for 48.8% of the Austrians, as is shown
in 2.3.
Table 2.3.: Overall Labor-force Participation Rates for Austria
1961-2001
Total domestic foreign
Total male female Total male female Total male female
1961 47.6 61.0 36.0 47.7 61.0 36.1 46.3 58.9 31.2
1971 41.8 54.6 30.4 41.2 53.9 30.0 65.0 75.0 49.6
1981 45.2 57.0 34.6 44.7 56.5 34.2 56.9 66.2 45.1
1991 47.3 57.5 37.7 46.5 56.6 37.3 58.1 67.8 45.4
2001 49.6 57.0 42.7 48.8 56.0 42.2 57.8 66.2 48.5
(Source: Prskawetz (1997), Statistik Austria: Census 1951-2001, own calculations)
Hence, not only the absolute number of citizens of other nationalities rose since
the beginning of working migration but also the participation rates compared to
the Austrian population. A glance at the female participation rates indicates that
foreign women show higher labor market presence than Austrian women. It is men-
tionable that the difference declined but the participation rate of immigrant women
is still about 15,5% higher than that of Austrian women in 2001. According to
Prskawetz, this is because of missing employment discontinuation of foreign women
due to marriage, births and parenting in the age above 25 years.
2.3. Development in regard of the EU-Enlargement 2004
In 2004 ten new member states joined the European Union which are Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and
Slovakia, including four countries conterminous with Austria. The Federal Ministry
of Economics and Labor of Austria conducted several studies on the long-term eco-
nomic performance with regard to the eastern enlargement of the EU and published
them on a homepage6. These studies analyze effects in trade (abolition of the re-
maining tariffs), domestic market processes (efficiency gains and increasing price
6http://euost.bmwa.gv.at/
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competition), factor shifts (foreign direct investments from West to East, working
migration from East to West) and further costs and transfers.
The studies detect a Win-Win-situation because the eastern enlargement creates
wealth benefits as well for the old EU15 as for the new EU10 which actually means
GDP growth for both. In the case of the EU10 these effects will be ten times as big
as for the EU15, since economists calculate the GDP growth caused by economic
integration in the EU10 on 3-8% between 2005 and 2010, compared to 0.5% additive
growth in the EU15. If we are talking about a Win-Win-situation of course the
question arises, to which extend the majority of the population will benefit from
this growth. It seems obviously that competitive enterprises gain from the abolition
of the last trade limitations (in the new member states as well as in Austria) but
there is no evidence that the situation has significantly changed for the population.
As an example one could take Poland with its almost 39 million inhabitants, which
is bigger than all other new member countries together. Poland’s exports of goods
rose from 53.53 billion US dollars in 2003 to 89,37 billion USD in 2005 (about 67%)
while the state’s tax revenues on income and profits fell from 9.95% (2002) to 6.13%
(2004) as a percentage of GDP. This indicates high corporate profitability. On the
other hand unemployment could not really be decreased (19.6% in 2003 to 17.7%
in 20057), taxes for the average workers as well as inflation grew8 and according to
the World Bank seven million Poles still live in poverty. This indicates that the
benefits of the EU-enlargement are distributed unequally and occur in two different
tempi for company owners and for the working population. These are definitely
push factors to leave the country, hoping to be able to partake in the benefits of the
enlargement and to improve the own existential situation. It would be canting to say
that the living conditions of millions of people in Eastern and Central Europe were
the reason for the enlargement. In reality the liberalization of the goods and service
sectors is a profitable deal especially for financial business and the goods-producing
industry of the ”old” European Union, like for Austria (cp. Altzinger 2008 and
Onaran 2008).
Since Austria has ever been gaining from the downsizing of the eastern borders,
this situation has even improved due to the EU-enlargement. According to a study of
Breuss (2006) real GDP will experience annual growth impulses of 0.15% between
7Even though the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor published actual figures, in which
Poland has lowered the unemployment rate on 13.8% in 2006
8All data from the OECD database on http://stats.oecd.org/
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2004 and 2014 caused by several positive aspects as falling prices in the domestic
market through increased competition or rising trade capacities. However, the ob-
jectives of the masterminds of the EU-enlargement seem to be reached: The growth
of the Austrian trade surplus with EU10 between 2003 and 2007 reached 33 percent
p.a. or numerical from 1.3 billion euros in 2003 to 4.1 billion in 2007 (cp. Table A.1
in Appendix).
This development is only curbed by the outflow of FDI into the new member states
but all in all the enlargement imposes positive effects on the economic performance
of Austria. As far as the Austrian labor market is concerned, the intensification of
migration has worsened the situation of the low skilled and immobile labor force.
Their risk of job loss increases while the wage development will lags behind qual-
ified workers. The Federal Ministry of Labor (2007, p. 4) calculates that a
slightly rise of the immigrant share by 1% would reduce wages by 0.26% and increase
individual dismissal risk by 0.8%, mainly in economic sectors where the supply of
foreign labor force is substitutive to the domestic workers. Also Keuschnigg/
Kohler (2002) calculate the impact of the eastern enlargement in Austria. The
authors assume the growth of unskilled labor force on 10.5% and an increase of the
number of skilled workers of 2.1%. As a consequence their model yields a drop in
the wages of low skilled workers by 5% while wages of skilled workers rise by 2.7%.
(cp. Bru¨ckner/Frick/Wagner 2006, p. 118).
The question of outsourcing employment from Austria into the new EU mem-
bers is not easy to handle. Breuss estimates, that one billion euros of investment
into the private sector would create 3,000 additional jobs. In 2003 Austria’s FDI
equaled 44 billion euros (or 19.5 percent of GDP) whereof 16 billion were invested
in CEE countries. With regard to a share of some 60 percent, that are sole cash
flow investments and 40 percent, that are real productive investments, the number
of “lost” workplaces accounts to a total of 53,000 abroad and approximately 20,000
thereof in CEE countries. In 2005 total FDI stocks amounted to 55 billion whereof
24 billion were invested in the CEE region9. This would mean a total of 66,000 lost
jobs whereof 29,000 were created in CEE.
In 2005, Austria’s migration balance with the (enlarged) European Union amounted
to +20,465, whereof 9,141 persons are Germans, followed by Poland (+4,575.), Slo-
vakia (+1,792) and Hungary (+1,305), as can be seen in Table 2.4. Even though
9Source of all figures on FDI: O¨sterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), www.oenb.at
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immigration of persons from the new member states rose from 3,040 to 8,842 in the
year of the border opening, this was not the expected overflow. In the following year
the EU10 immigration was constant with Poland contributing more than half of all
foreigners (54.4%), followed by Slovakia (21.3%) and Hungary (15.5%). Moreover
the figures of Yugoslavian and Turkish immigrants stagnated at +11,383 (2005) and
+5,038 (2005) respectively. After the peak of 2005 immigration from the new EU
members has declined substantially to +5,647 in 2007.
Table 2.4.: Migration Balance around the EU-Enlargement
2004
2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
EU-10 5,647 6,425 8,416 8,842 3,040 2,852
Estonia 20 16 29 35 19 15
Latvia 23 23 28 80 43 45
Lithuania 46 66 108 84 44 33
Malta 2 2 5 2 0 0
Poland 2,022 3,136 4,575 4,997 1,071 856
Slovakia 1,254 1,384 1,792 1,897 977 998
Slovenia 228 151 123 217 -15 -53
Czech Republic 242 310 442 448 293 345
Hungary 1,796 1,333 1,305 1,078 604 613
Cyprus 14 4 9 4 4 0
EU-14 12,583 11,320 12,049 9,534 8,182 6,142
Germany 10,242 9,076 9,414 7,598 6,040 4,286
(Source: Statistik Austria)
Statistik Austria assumes that the economic progress in the eastern countries will
lead to a slow-down in total immigration and even halve the number of foreigners
crossing the Austrian border from 40,000 in 2002 to 20,000 in 201010.
Summing up the effects of the EU-enlargement 2004 it can be stated, that the
predicted overflow of immigrants on the domestic labor market has not taken place,
although the opening of the borders could not eliminate all the push-factors in the
eastern countries yet.
10The same development is stated to be true for the whole European Union, for which the number
of 335,000 in the first year of the enlargement will decline on 150,000 immigrants in only one
decade.
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3. The Economics of
Discrimination
Discrimination and Prejudice are not usually said to occur when someone
prefers looking at a glamorous Hollywood actress rather than at some
other woman; yet they are said to occur when he prefers living next to
whites rather than next to Negroes. (Becker 1971, p. 13)
The present chapter intends to offer a theoretical approach to the mat-
ter of economic discrimination by means of an interdisciplinary analysis
of political economy and social as well as historical science. Moreover,
not only the monetary conception of discrimination will be discussed,
but also other consequences of discrimination like differences in un-
employment and poverty risks. Finally, this chapter gives a review of
the existing literature on economic discrimination concentrating on the
immigrant-native wage gap in Europe.
Every scientific discipline tries to handle with phenomena, like discrimination,
with its own methods and theoretic approaches. Psychologists will tend to describe
an individual’s behavior as a consequence of different personality types, whereas
sociologists may have the perspective of a wider scale of society. In sociological
perceptions of minorities, the view is concentrated on the interaction between the
majority, which attitudes are based on consensus creating prejudices and unites itself
in animosity against nonmembers of that group, and an alien group which is char-
acterized by insecurity, fear and the feeling of being out of place (cp. Ko¨nig 1958).
Of course an economic approach to discrimination may not ignore the results
achieved by other disciplines, far from it, they should be used to develop economic
theories. But applied economics has the decisive advantage that fields of research
like inequality can be quantified and expressed in numbers. Cain (1986, p. 698)
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states, that ”[t]astes are fundamentally taken as given, and explaining their sources
or how they may be changed tends to be left to other social sciences. Instead, the
economist’s main objective is to determine certain behavioral outcomes that are the
consequences of these tastes [...]”
In this work, the tracks of Cain will be left for a second. Before carrying out
calculations on the consequences of discrimination, a theoretical perception of in-
equality will be introduced. This is not trivial since many papers tend to neglect
the roots of discrimination, and just analyze the consequences. The following sec-
tion centers on the fundamentals on which discrimination is taking place and which
shapes inequality may adopt.
3.1. The Emergence of Economic Discrimination
To examine economic discrimination, the processes of production in a society should
be in the center of notice. Of course discrimination11 may only unfold if there is more
than one person involved in the production process. How could there exist economic
discrimination in a subsistence economy? Correspondingly Mandel (1998) finds no
necessity for slavery –as a form of discrimination- in primitive agriculture with no
surplus because the economic fundament is missing and a slave could just produce
as much as to reproduce himself. ”Unter primitiven Bedingungen gibt es keine
Sklaverei. In einer Zeit, in der zwei Ha¨nde nicht mehr erzeugen, als ein Mund
verzehrt, fehlt hierfu¨r einfach die o¨konomische Grundlage”, Mandel (1998, p. 41)
states.
Only with the development and the improvement of production processes12 and
consequently the possibility to create surplus, a part of society may be able to aban-
don productive work and to live at the cost of the other part’s production. While
the one part just receives as much as to reproduce its labor force, the other part
lives by expropriating the surplus produced by the first ones. This form of economic
discrimination is perhaps one of the most decisive points in human history - the
split into classes. In Marxian view working women and immigrants suffer a dou-
11Discrimination may also occur in the form of heightened exploitation of a special layer of society.
Cain (1986, p. 709) states, that neoclassical and institutional theories on discrimination have
adopted Marxian theory on exploitation.
12For example the role of the metallurgic revolution in the invention of new tools or artificial
irrigation were crucial for the improvement of agricultural production.
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ble inequality, first the exploitation as workers, second the heightened exploitation
through discrimination. This first sort of economic inequality which is most evi-
dently in the capitalist system is hardly noticed as discrimination in any standard
economic textbook13.
Doubtlessly these crude forms of discrimination were cruel and barbarous but as
history developed from simple to complex forms of cooperation of human beings,
also social interrelations complicated. The volatility of capitalist production with
sudden expansions and reductions in industrial output, required (and still requires) a
similarly volatile working potential (cp. Mandel 1998, p. 66). Hence, big migration
waves took place in the whole era of capitalism: the Irish migrated to England and
Scotland; the Polish to Germany; Italians and later North Africans, Spaniards and
Portuguese to France; Coreans to Japan and so on. All these immigrant groups suf-
fered from increased exploitation and oppression. They received the lowest salaries,
lived under degrading housing conditions and had to face several discriminating
laws.
Man fu¨hrte tausend diskriminierende Maßnahmen ein (vor allem, was
die Gewa¨hrung gleicher bu¨rgerlicher, politischer und gewerkschaftlicher
Rechte anbelangte), um ihre intellektuelle und moralische Entwicklung
zu unterbinden und sie in dauernder Einschu¨chterung und versta¨rkter
Ausbeutung zu halten. (Mandel 1998, p. 67)
Economic discrimination in the modern capitalist state can barely be compared
with these circumstances in history. The production process is much more complex
due to the collaboration of several workers in the same fabrication limited in space
and time14.
According to that, the focus of an analysis of the interaction between indigenous
and immigrants should be aimed at the sphere of production. In his study ”Die
Bundesrepublik: Ein Einwanderungsland?”, Friedrich Heckmann (cited in Ker-
ber/Schmieder 1991, p. 389-390) states that working immigrants generally receive
13Shahriari (2005) analyses the connectivity between class societies and discrimination, as was
developed by Max Weber and Karl Marx.
14i.e. the historic and conceptual beginning of capitalist production: ”Das Wirken einer gro¨ßern
Arbeiterzahl zur selben Zeit, in demselben Raum (oder, wenn man will, auf demselben Ar-
beitsfeld), zur Produktion derselben Warensorte, unter dem Kommando desselben Kapital-
isten, bildet historisch und begriﬄich den Ausgangspunkt der kapitalistischen Produktion.”
(Marx 1977, p. 341)
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lower industrial employment, that they have to face discriminating reproduction con-
ditions and - most important - that only the production process links these minorities
to the majority. The fact that social interaction between natives and foreigners is
more or less reduced to the production process emphasizes the outstanding role of
the economic sphere in analyzing discrimination of minority groups. Probably the
most famous economist who dealt with this subject is Gary S. Becker.
3.2. The Economics of Discrimination
Theoretical Framework of Gary S. Becker
In his seminal work ”The Economics of Discrimination”, which was first published
in 1957 and republished in a second edition in 1971, Gary Becker concentrates on
wage inequality. Becker points out that money is a common benchmark in economic
systems and should therefore also serve as a measure of discrimination. Cain (1986,
p. 695) puts this concept in a nut shell: ”Under what conditions will essentially
identical goods have different prices in competitive markets? [...] Discrimination in
the labor market takes labor services as the good in question and the wage rate as
the price.”
Becker therefore uses a conceptual discrimination coefficient to distinguish the
money cost and the net costs to employ someone. If an employer is faced with a
money wage rate Π of a certain factor, the net wage rate should be Π(1 +di), where
di is the discrimination coefficient (further DC) for this factor. According to Becker
the DC can take on any value between zero and plus infinity.
If an individual has a ”taste for discrimination,” he must act as if he
were willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced
income, to be associated with some persons instead of others. When
actual discrimination occurs, he must, either pay or forfeit income for
this privilege. (Becker 1971, p. 14)
Becker distinguishes between ignorance and prejudice. An employer who refuses
to hire members of a certain group erroneously underestimates their economic effi-
ciency. This ignorance may be quickly eliminated by the spread of knowledge, he
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states. A prejudice, however, is relatively independent of knowledge.
In his analysis Becker starts with two groups of laborers (whites [W] and non-
whites [N] respectively) which are perfect substitutes15 in production. In a perfectly
competitive labor market the equilibrium wage rate would be the same for both
groups. Becker introduces a market discrimination coefficient (MDC) which is de-
fined as the proportional difference between the wage rates (cp. Becker 1971,
p. 17). The MDC is shown in Equation 3.1 with Πw and Πn as wage rates of W and
N.
MDC =
Πw − Πn
Πn
(3.1)
For simplicity two societies consisting each only of W or N and confined to two
factors of production -capital and labor- are shaped. Each unit of the factors labor
or capital of N is a perfect substitute in production for each counterpart of W,
and each society benefits from exporting its relatively abundant factors: W exports
capital, and N labor. In a full equilibrium without discrimination, Becker compiles
the following three conditions (cp. Becker 1971, p. 20):
 payment to each factor would be independent of whether it was employed with
N or W
 the price of each product would be independent of whether it was produced
by N or W
 the unit payment to each factor would equal its marginal value product.
Becker argues that the desire to discriminate against labor and capital of N means
for W to forfeit monetary income. Further, discrimination reduces the net return
that W capital could receive by employing it with N labor, and this leads to a
decrease of W capital exported. Since less exported capital to N reduces the income
N labor can generate by combining with W capital, also less N labor is exported. To
sum up, less labor and less capital are exported by N and W, respectively. Hence,
discrimination hurts W as well as N.
15If they were imperfect substitutes, they could receive different wage rates even without discrim-
ination.
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This can be shown in some calculations (cp. Becker 1971, p. 32-34). Let the net
money return to domestic labor and capital in W be Πl(W ) and Πc(W ) then the
return equals its marginal productivity as follows
Πc(W ) =
∂f
∂c
(c = cw − ct; l = lw) = ∂f
∂c
(cw − ct; lw),
Πl(W ) =
∂f
∂l
(c = cw − ct; l = lw) = ∂f
∂l
(cw − ct; lw),
(3.2)
where f is the production function, cw and lw denote the total supply of labor
and capital by W and ct is the amount of capital exported. Further the equilibrium
net income of W is
Y (W ) = cwΠc(W ) + lwΠl(W ) = cw
∂f
∂c
(cw − ct; lw) + lw ∂f
∂l
(cw − ct; lw) (3.3)
The labor force of N is allocated between imported W capital (ct) and domestic
N capital (cn). The equilibrium net income of N therefore is
Y (N) = cnΠc(N) + lnΠl(N) = cn
∂f ′
∂c
(cn + ct; ln) + ln
∂f ′
∂l
(cn + ct; ln), (3.4)
where f ′ is the production function of N. An increase in discrimination by W
would mean a reduction of the amount of capital exported to N. Therefore the
latter is a monotonic function of W’s taste for discrimination. Becker shows that if
f and f ′ are homogeneous functions of the first degree,
∂Y (W )
∂ct
> 0, (3.5)
∂Y (N)
∂ct
> 0, (3.6)
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and thus discrimination by W (meaning less W capital exported) drops the net
incomes of both N and W. To prove the inequalities 3.5 and 3.5 Becker applies
Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions, yielding
c · ∂(∂f/∂c)
∂c
+ l · ∂(∂f/∂c)
∂l
≡ 0,
or
c · ∂
2f
∂c2
+ l · ∂
2f
∂l∂c
≡ 0.
(3.7)
Since
∂f
∂ct
≡ ∂f
∂c
∂c
∂ct
(3.8)
and ∂c/∂ct = −1 as a consequence of c = cw − ct, then finally
∂f
∂ct
≡ −∂f
∂c
. (3.9)
Out of equations 3.7 and 3.9 it is easy to show that
c · ∂
2f
∂c2t
≡ l · ∂
2f
∂l∂ct
. (3.10)
Further we are able to derive by using equation 3.9
∂Y (W )
∂ct
≡ l · ∂
2f
∂l∂ct
− cw · ∂
2f
∂c2t
, (3.11)
and by substituting equation 3.10 in 3.11 we finally my denote
∂Y (W )
∂ct
≡ −ct∂
2f
∂c2t
. (3.12)
Becker states, that if there is diminishing marginal productivity ∂2f/∂c2t < 0 and
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since ct ≥ 0 it must follow the proof that
∂Y (W )
∂ct
≥ 0 Q.E.D. (3.13)
With this proof, Becker shows that changes in resource allocation driven by a taste
for discrimination reduce the equilibrium net incomes of both N and W. However
not all factors are affected in the same way. While the return to W capital and N
labor falls, the return to W labor and N capital actually augments. Thus, Becker
wonders:
There is a remarkable agreement in the literature on the proposition
that capitalists from the dominant group are the major beneficiaries
of prejudice and discrimination in a competitive capitalistic economy.
(Becker 1971, p. 21)
According to Becker this does not fit together with his results, that the returns to
W capital shrinks. There would be a misleading conclusion that if the equilibrium
wage rate for N labor decreases compared to the one of W labor, the difference of
these wage rates must be realized in higher profits to W capitalists. However, these
profits would exist only if the wage differential resulted from price discrimination
due to monopsony power, Becker concludes.
Theoretically trade between two societies is maximized with the absence of dis-
crimination, and trade decreases with the increase in discrimination. As discrimina-
tion might increase so much that trade would no longer pay out, this could lead to
complete economic segregation. In Figure 3.1 p0 represents the income of W and N
with no discrimination, p1 with complete segregation. The curve p0wp1 represents
the different amounts of discrimination by W. Hence, incomes reach a minimum in
p1 where trade between N and W is precluded due to discrimination
16. To sum up,
according to Becker complete segregation does not avoid economic disadvantages17
as a result of discrimination, but only intensifies them.
16Line p0np1 represents discrimination by N. If both N and W discriminate, the representation of
their incomes must be in the area confined by p0np1w. The curve p0wnp1 summarizes a set of
situations in which W discriminates more than N does.
17Becker cites a movement in the 1920’s under the leadership of Marcus Garvey, which wanted to
take Afroamericans back to Africa to escape from discrimination in the USA and to completely
segregate themselves economically.
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Figure 3.1.: The effect of Discrimination on Incomes
(Source: Becker 1971, p. 23)
Employer Discrimination
In accordance with neoclassical economic theory, Becker states that objective be-
havior is based on considerations of productivity alone. If an employer refuses to
hire a person with a higher marginal value than his marginal costs, it is called dis-
crimination. Unlike, if the employer does not hire a person with a marginal value
that is below the marginal costs. Again, in this case an employer confronted with
a wage rate Π acts as if the net wage rate would be Π(1 + d), where d is the dis-
crimination coefficient. The costs of discrimination on the other hand are forfeited
profits, writes Becker. So if Πw is less than Πn(1 + d), an employer would only hire
W, and vice versa.
The larger the number of prejudiced employers, or the stronger the intensity of
their preference respectively, the greater are the wage and employment gaps between
native and immigrant workers. Even if there exist enough unprejudiced employers
to hire all minority workers, wage disparities may persist. Hence, ”in the present of
any labor market imperfection that makes job search costly, unprejudiced employers
will take advantage of the fact that minority workers have less attractive labor market
alternatives to offer them lower wages” (OECD 2008, p. 151).
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In competitive industries, employers with a taste for discrimination against N
would hire fewer N workers than the profit-maximizing number. They would employ
more higher paid but equally skilled W labor. In a competitive market, Becker’s
theory states, that non-discriminating firms could displace discriminating employers
due to their higher costs. Hence the market discrimination coefficient (MDC) would
equal zero.
[...] If the production functions of each firm were linear and homoge-
neous, the MDC would equal zero if at least one employer had a zero
DC. Conventional theory usually ”assumes” that all employers endeavor
to maximize money income. (Becker 1971, p. 45)
Hence, Becker links the degree of employer discrimination to the degree of market
or monopolistic power. The wage gap should therefore be smaller in more com-
petitive markets. For example, Ashenfelter and Hannan18 proof this for gender
discrimination and the banking sector.
Cain (1986, p. 710) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of Becker’s theory.
One advantage is that discrimination is potentially measurable and monetary units
have a meaning to experts as well as laypersons, contrary to certain attitudinal
scales that may not be expressed numerically. However, this could be seen as a
disadvantage as well, since no attention is paid to any pain or stigma felt by the
victim of discrimination.
Another critics arises in an article by Arrow (1972). He suggests that employer’s
discriminatory tastes may not be seen as a constant which is independent of the
ethnic composition in an enterprise. It rather could be described as an increasing
function of the ratio of foreigners-to-natives employees. Arrow (1972, p. 89) states,
that distaste may depend on ”social distance” rather than ”physical distance”.
3.3. Job stability and poverty risks of immigrants
Another question that arises besides wage discrimination is the stability of employ-
ment for immigrants. Biffl (2002) states that the wage differential between immi-
18Ashenfelter, O./Hannan, T.: Sex Discrimination and Product Market Competition: The Case
of the Banking Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1986, 149-173
23
grants and Austrians depends on the business cycle. According to the author, wage
inequality diminishes in an economic downturn and widens in a boom. Low skilled
workers with small wages loose their jobs first in a slump, since low skilled indus-
trial sectors are underlying stronger fluctuations in demand than high wage sectors
(cp. Biffl 2002, p. 544). Hence, the average wage especially of immigrant workers
rise due to the omission of lower wages. With an average annual GDP growth of
1.8 percent19, the median income of immigrants employed in Austria between 1981
and 1988 was 11 to 14 percent below the corresponding value of Austrians. In the
period of 1989 to 1995 when the economic upswing generated a GDP growth of 2.6
percent, the wage differential was much wider, as Figure 3.2 shows. With data from
the Austrian social insurance system the peak can be dated to 1991 with a median
wage gap of 23%, when real GDP grew 4.6% in 1990 and 3.6% in 1991. So the
theory of Biﬄ turns out to be consistent with the data.
Figure 3.2.: Difference of Monthly Median Income between Immigrants and
Austrians
(Source: Biffl 2002)
Naturally, the chance to be employed for one additional year is higher in times
of economic prosperity than in times of recession. However Biffl (2002, p. 546)
explains, that the probability for foreigners to be employed one additional year is
considerably smaller than the likelihood for natives. A similar analysis is given by
19Data from OECD Factbook 2009
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Prettner/Stiglbauer (2007). According to them, the wage differential reflects
the fact, that immigrants are hired to cover the peaks in labor force demand and
are laid off in times of a drop in demand, a sort of fluctuation labor force.
An expression used by sociologists could be taken as apposite for the immigrant
workers pool: the industrial reserve army of labor. This concept was developed
by Marx (1977) in an economic debate on the perception of overpopulation with
the political economist Thomas Robert Malthus20 (cp. Berger 2004, p. 143 and
Rosdolsky 1968, p. 289-301). Marx states that with the development of modern
economy the share of constant capital in the production process increases in relation
to the variable capital, which means an extended use of machinery compared to
human labor force. With increasing productivity the absolute number of employed
may rise but by trend the demand for workers shrinks with the implementation of
new machinery. Thus there exists a surplus labor force which is not needed for the
production process, the so-called industrial reserve army. But besides this long-run
tendency the short-term economic cycle and consequently the level of investments
influences the size of employed and unemployed workers, as Marx states.
Der charakteristische Lebenslauf der modernen Industrie, die Form eines
durch kleinere Schwankungen unterbrochenen zehnja¨hrigen Zyklus von
Perioden mittlerer Lebendigkeit, Produktion unter Hochdruck, Krise
und Stagnation, beruht auf der besta¨ndigen Bildung, gro¨ßern oder gerin-
gern Absorption und Wiederbildung der industriellen Reservearmee [...]
(Marx 1977, p. 661)
So if a capital owner expects that his supplied capital receives an appropriate
realization in the production sphere, investments as well as the demand for labor
will increase. At that point a capital owner will hire workers out of the reserve pool
until the time of prosperity comes to an end and these workers are dismissed again.
In his theory on the industrial reserve army, Marx classifies three forms of indus-
trial reserve army: floating, latent and stagnant. Probably a mixture of the first
and the last type is the most appropriate expression for immigrants. Marx describes
the latter category as inexhaustible pool of workers with very unstable and irregular
employment. Their living standard is below that of an average worker and exactly
this turns them into dangerous rivals in the wage competition on the labor market.
20Meek, Ronald (Ed.): Marx und Engels u¨ber Malthus. Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1956
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This is exactly what is described in a paper by Arai/Vilhelmsson (2001).
The main purpose of their work was to examine whether individual productivity
measures can eliminate differences in unemployment risk between immigrants and
natives in Sweden. Hence, the impact of various individual characteristics on the
unemployment risk was estimated with a large sample of employees aged 18 to 60
in 1991. The authors calculate the risk of becoming unemployed for a sample of
employees, that is employed at a certain point of time.
The message of the results of Arai and Vilhelmsson is unambiguous: There are
significant and huge differences in risk of ending up in unemployment in 1995, if
the individual was employed in 1991. The unemployment risk for non-Europeans
is almost twice as large compared to natives. Europeans and Nordic workers have
between 25 and 10% higher risks than natives. According to the study this is not
due to differences in the age structure of immigrants, far from it, differences increase
if an age dummy is included into the regression. One explanation therefore is that
immigrants tend to be on temporary contracts more often than natives, which raises
the risk of becoming jobless.
The results suggest that the major part of the estimated differences in unemploy-
ment risks between natives and immigrants remain after controlling for individual
characteristics, like age, gender, marital status, educational level, and so on. The
conclusion of the authors is, that an explanation for the observed pattern is discrim-
inatory behavior and stereotype beliefs in the Swedish labor market.
To sum up, it can be stated that working immigrants could be seen as a industrial
reserve army due to three main characteristics: Most immigrants form a fluctuating
labor force depending on the economic cycle, they often are employed under unstable
and irregular conditions and native workers tend to see them as rivals in the wage
competition.
Lelkes (2007) analyzes the level of poverty of migrants in 14 European countries.
The author states, that EU and non-EU migrants are two very distinct groups as far
as their exposure to poverty is concerned. The study is based on the first wave of
EU-SILC in the year 2004 which included 13 European Union countries and Norway.
One result of the analysis is, that migrants from non-EU countries are exposed to a
multiple times higher risk of poverty than natives21.
21The indicator of poverty is the so-called ”at-risk-of-poverty rate”, which is part of the portfolio
of indicators adopted by the Laeken European Council. It shows the share of persons with an
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Figure 3.3.: The Risk of Poverty among Migrants
(Source: Lelkes 2007)
The poverty risk of migrants from European Union countries varies
greatly by country, but it is clearly favorable to other migrants, or at
times even to non-migrants. The “EU/non-EU” gap among migrants is
particularly marked in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Norway. [...]
Austria seems to have a specific situation, as poverty among people born
in the EU tends to be also nearly twice as high as among non-migrants.
(Lelkes 2007, p. 2)
The author states, that the existing gap between EU and non-EU migrants to
a large extend is attributable to their characteristics, like schooling or labor mar-
ket experience. In Figure 3.3 the risks of poverty for EU and non-EU migrants is
shown for several countries. As can be seen, Austria is in the middle of the sample.
Herzog-Punzenberger (2003, p. 1125) gives an example of poverty among for-
eigners in Austria. According to her, 40% of all Turkish and Yugoslav households
in Vienna live in substandard flats, which are relatively cheap because of their poor
equivalised disposable income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the
national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers.
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quality, often with water and toilets outside of their flats.
3.4. European Studies on the Immigrant Wage Gap
While in the United States scientific publications have been dealing with income
inequality by ethnicity or origin for quite a long time (like the Dillingham Immigra-
tion Commission Reports), research in Europe is slowly emerging22. However, there
are some papers that highlight the earnings situation of immigrants in European
countries and show varying results on the effect of discrimination.
One of these exceptions is a paper by Lang (2000), who analyzes the native-
immigrant wage differentials in Germany23. The population of immigrants in Ger-
many is quite high. After several immigration waves, especially since the beginning
of the 1980s, currently more than 12% of the German population is foreign-born.
There are large wage disparities, for example income of Turks are 24% below the
average of natives. Even after correcting for working time, a differential of 17%
remains. The statistical method adapted in this study is that of a fontier earnings
function.
[T]he earnings frontier gives the highest potential income associated with
varying amounts of human capital inputs. All individuals are below
this curve. In a second step, the individual-specific distance from the
frontier are explained by a bundle of possible sources, with assimilation
and ethnic discrimination at the core of interest [...] (Lang 2000, p. 2)
Of course also the reference group is suffering from earnings inefficiency, hence only
the difference between the inefficiency levels of natives and immigrants is possibly
influenced by discrimination. Other sources for observed income inefficiency could
be regional or occupational immobility of employees, information deficiencies, or
market power of firms. The author uses the German Socio-Economic Panel for his
calculations, confined to a sample of males between 18 and 64 years of age. All
part-time employees below 20 working-hours a week were excluded.
With a human capital earnings function the potential income curve is computed,
22There is some research on immigration in Europe in general, like Parsons/Smeeding (2006)
or Bauer (2008) for the case of Austria.
23An update of his analysis is presented by Lang (2004).
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where every year of schooling rises the potential earnings by roughly 3.5% and
each year of unemployment decreases the wage frontier by about 2.5%. At average,
employees could realize 88% of their potential earnings as actual earnings. Quite a
high share of the observed wage differential between the groups could be explained
by different positions on the frontier earnings curve. For example the low wage of
Turks was explained by more than 94% by their modest human capital endowment
(cp. Lang 2000, p. 10).
Golder (2000) analyzes the wage gap in Switzerland. Between 1945 and 1998
the share of foreigners in Switzerland has almost quadrupled from 5 to nearly 20%.
Golder calculates a wage gap of 15.5 percent for immigrant males compared to
natives. In this study, the discrimination effect bears a larger weight than the
endowment effect on the wage differential. For males and females, schooling and
experience explain the most of the earnings differential, although the shift coefficient
has a large effect in the earnings decomposition. As far as the ethnic wage gap among
males is concerned, 10.5 percentage points of 15,5% are due to the discrimination
effect and 5 percentage points due to endowments24. Within females, 14.1 percentage
points of the wage differences are due to discrimination, erasing a 1% advantage for
immigrants attributed to endowments. The wage gap between immigrant and native
females accounts to 13.2% in Switzerland.
Nielsen et al. (2004) examine wage gaps between immigrants and natives in
Denmark. The fraction of immigrants in the Danish population has risen from 2.7
to 5.6% in the years between 1980 and 2000 and reached approximately 300,000
individuals. Like in Austria, the fundamental reasons for migration changed by
time. While in the 1960s and early 1970s the dominant part were labor migrants,
refugee immigration grew rapidly after the mid 1980s. The empirical analysis was
carried out with two register-based data sets for the period of 1984 to 1995. The
sample is restricted to the age of 20 to 59 in order to reduce selection problems due
to retirement and schooling. The authors find out, that spending time working in
Denmark increases immigrant wages for at least the first five years. Afterwards the
experience profile is getting flatter, but the returns are still positive. For natives,
the experience profile has the usual concave shape.
As far as the immigrant wage gap is concerned, male Nordic foreigners earn more
than Danish males due to their specific skills. Immigrants from Turkey, Africa and
24The portion of discrimination varies between 7.3 and 10.5 percentage points depending on the
weights. The portion of endowments varies between 8.2 and 5.0 percentage points, respectively.
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Pakistan are faced with the biggest ethnic wage gaps of 22 to 26%. The female wage
gap is smaller than that of males, ranging from 9% for immigrants from India and
Sri Lanka to 17-18% for females from Turkey, Africa and Pakistan. Considering the
gender wage gap within all the ethnic groups, immigrant women are considerably
disadvantaged in Denmark. As far as the decomposition is concerned an interesting
result occurs within the group of Nordic immigrants. There is a significant wage gap
of 15% due to lower qualifications but on the other hand a negative discrimination
of 17% which could be denoted as favoritism. For other countries like Turkey, Africa
and Pakistan there is a large qualification gap compared to natives.
A study by Nordin/Rooth (2007) intends to explain the ethnic income gap in
Sweden. The group of second generation immigrants in 2002 was as large as some
ten percent of total Swedish population. The analysis is based on a data set provided
by the Statistics Sweden and the Swedish National Service Administration which
contain every single individual living in Sweden. Hence the sample is large, with
500,965 native men and 77,267 second generation immigrant men, aged 28 to 38.
The authors discover that the income gap differs a great deal with family origin
and with whether one or both parents are born abroad. The wage gap is especially
large (between 6 and 12%) for male second generation immigrants with one or both
parents born in Southern Europe or outside Europe. Contrary to former Swedish
studies, the authors find that the income gap depends strongly on a skill gap and
less on discrimination.
Another paper was written by Denny/Harmon/Roche (1997) on the long-term
earnings differentials in Great Britain. The investigation period ranges from 1974 to
1993 and the subject of matter is the distribution of discrimination. For example, if
the average wage gap between 1974 and 1993 is 5% in favour of natives, it could be
that in 1974 all immigrants earn 5% less than natives and in 1993 half of immigrants
earn the same amounts as natives, and the other half earns 10% less. The data used
is provided by the General Household Survey (GHS). The results of the study show
that discrimination in Great Britain may rather be ethnic than due to migrant
status alone. Across the split between migrants and natives, the migrant sample is
discriminated against, but comparing white natives to white immigrants does not
show any strong presence of discrimination practices, the paper shows.
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4. Segregation and Assimilation
In most countries immigrants have lower wage rates compared to natives.
This phenomenon may have several causes; it can be caused by differences
in ”standard” human capital, also denoted qualifications; it can be due
to differences in host country specific human capital - a hopefully tran-
sitory component, whose gradual disappearance is called ”assimilation”.
Finally, the differences in wages between immigrants and natives may be
a result of discrimination, that is, differences in returns to the variables
determining wages. (Nielsen et al. 2004, p. 855)
This chapter addresses to the issue, what may, besides discrimination,
influence the level of earnings of immigrants. There are several factors
that are often discussed in the literature. Beginning with educational
imbalances and occupational segregation, the reverse flow of assimila-
tion is also mentioned. This section therefore discusses the origins of
segregation on the labor market and outlines the effects of assimilation
on the wage levels of immigrants.
4.1. Educational Imbalances in Austria
For a big part individual positioning in social systems results from origin and educa-
tion status. The question arises, if there are any disparities in prospects about the
educational level between natives and immigrants. Crul/Vermeulen (2006) ana-
lyzed the participation of second-generation Turkish immigrants in the educational
systems in five European nations: Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and
Austria. The authors chose Turks for their study because -numbering up to four
million- they are the largest immigrant group in Europe and are represented in
several European countries. The study focuses on second-generation immigrants
as they are almost entirely children of labor migrants and rarely refugees who fled
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political persecution or the conflict between Kurds and Turks.
In their analysis, relevant indicators for educational status are school attendance
rates, educational performance of pupils and students, highest educational attain-
ments of graduates and dropouts as well as dropout percentages and repeater rates
(Crul/Vermeulen 2006, p. 239). There are some interesting outcomes about the
transition from the education system to the labor market. First of all, in France,
Belgium and the Netherlands, between one-third and one-half of Turkish children
begin their secondary school careers in lower vocational tracks, which are the lowest
secondary school types. This is true for at least between two-thirds and three-
quarters of second-generation pupils in Austria and Germany. On the other side far
more Turks pursue preparatory tracks for higher education in Belgium and France.25
Table 4.1.: Institutional Standards for Education in Selected EU Countries
Countries School Starting age Primary school Selection age
Austria 6 Half day 10
Belgium 2.5 Full day 14
France 2.5 Full day 15
Germany 6 Half day 10 or 12
The Netherlands 4 Full day 12
(Source: Crul 2007)
In Table 4.1 some institutional education standards are listed to highlight some
crucial characteristics pertaining to the development of native and immigrant chil-
dren in the various school systems. According to Crul (2007), Turkish (as well as
all) children in Belgium and France start school at the age of two or three while in
Austria and Germany they attend school at the age of six.
Therefore, this cohort of children in France and Belgium has about three
to four more years of schooling during a crucial developmental phase in
which they begin learning the language of the host nation. (Crul 2007)
25Even though it seems that second-generation Turks have more opportunities to track a higher
school career in France and Belgium, they more often fail to gain a secondary school diploma
and have problems to take place in the labor market without diploma. Hence the apprenticeship
system in Austria and Germany enables immigrant children to perform the transition between
education and labor market in a more efficient way. Unemployment among second-generation
Turks in Austria or Germany is three to four times lower than in Belgium, France and The
Netherlands.
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Referring to the second column it can be stated, that for example nine-year-
olds in the Netherlands have a total of 1,019 hours tuition with teachers compared
to only 661 hours in German schools, which are about 10 hours less per week.
To compensate the fewer pupil-teacher contacts, Austrian and German pupils are
assigned more homework, which is a disadvantage for second-generation children
since they won’t receive any substantial support from their parents who are often
unable to understand the domestic language. Moreover the selection age for further
education is very low in Austria (at the age of 10) and Germany (10 or 12 years of age
depending on the federal states of Germany). According to Crul immigrant children
have too little time to overcome their disadvantaged starting position. That’s why
most immigrant pupils end up in the lowest track of secondary school which is the
Hauptschule.
To sum up, Crul and Vermeulen state that the French system is more effective in
guiding second-generation Turks towards higher educational levels, like university,
but the Austrian and German models rather assure success in the transfer to the
labor market26.
Biffl (2002) analyses the situation of immigrants in the Austrian education sys-
tem. She states for 1997, that immigrants report higher rates of lack of compulsory
education as well as higher rates of university graduates than Austrians. About
4.1% of foreigners do not own a graduate in compulsory schooling compared to only
0.6% of the Austrian population. On the other hand 5.5% of all foreigners, who
are living in Austria, are alumni of universities while this is only true for 4.2% of
the Austrians27. Moreover 4.8% of Turkish children attend special schools (Son-
derschule) compared to 1.1% of Austrian children. The labor force survey of the
Statistik Austria draws a similar picture by analyzing the educational levels with
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 97)28 as presented
in Table 4.2.
26Another detailed analysis of immigrants in the Austrian school system is given by Herzog-
Punzenberger (2003).
27In Appendix B.2 the shares of natives and immigrants with a university degree in several OECD
nations are illustrated. According to the numbers, eleven percent of natives and immigrants
have are graduates of a university - hence, slightly different to the figures of Biﬄ.
280 = nursery school, 1-2 = compulsory school, 3-4 = secondary school, 5-6 = university and
doctorates
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Table 4.2.: Educational Distribution by ISCED
97 and Nationality in 2005
Total ISCED 97
0-2 3-4 5-6
In 1,000s
Austria 4,914.1 1,103.4 3,063.3 747.5
Non-Austrians 601.5 234.4 281.8 85.4
EU 25 177.6 24.2 105.0 48.5
therefrom EU 15 106.0 14.5 57.1 34.4
fm. Yugoslavia 226.1 110.0 106.5 9.6
Turkey 86.5 63.8 20.9 1.8
Others 111.3 36.5 49.3 254
(Source: Statistik Austria: Arbeitskra¨ftererhebung 2005)
Roughly 22.4% of the Austrian labor force are located in the lowest education level,
including nursery and compulsory school while 62.3% attended secondary school.
Within Turks it is just the opposite distribution: 73.8% completed compulsory school
and only 24.1% conducted further education. It is to mention that an outstanding
presence in the highest level of education (university and doctorates) is contributed
by immigrants from the EU15. Almost one third of these countries’ labor force is
provided with university skills. The dataset EU-SILC 2005 supports this fact for
2005 as can be seen in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3.: Educational Distribution by nationalities in EU-SILC 2005
1) % 2) % 3) % 4) % 5) % 6) %
Austria 55 65.5 2,214 84.12 3,351 92.19 626 82.26 97 82.2 9,200 88.3
EU15 0 0 31 1.18 57 1.57 57 7.49 13 11.02 235 2.26
new EU10 0 0 34 1.29 42 1.16 27 3.55 2 1.69 194 1.86
fm. YUG 16 19.5 213 8.09 134 3.69 9 1.18 1 0.85 447 4.29
Turkey 10 11.9 96 3.65 26 0.72 3 0.39 0 0 148 1.42
Others 3 3.57 44 1.67 25 0.69 39 5.12 5 4.24 188 1.8
1.) No compulsory schooling, 2.) Compulsory schooling, 3.) Apprenticeship, 4.) University degree, 5.) Doctorate, 6.) Sample in
EU-SILC 2005
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
It is noticeable that Turkish citizens, compared to their share in the whole sam-
ple (1.42%), are represented disproportionately often in the lower education levels.
11.9% of all individuals without any graduate and 3.65% of those who solely fin-
ished compulsory schooling are Turkish immigrants. The same thing is true for
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immigrants from former Yugoslavia (19.5% and 8.09% respectively). At the other
end of the education scale we find an over-representation of people especially from
the EU15. While they only account for 2.26% of the sample, they supply 7.49% of
all alumni of universities and even 11.02% of all doctorates.
Hence immigrants are present on both poles of the education scale, but while
people from Turkey and former Yugoslavia are exceptionally often represented in
the lower education levels, citizen from EU and EEC are equipped with high qual-
ifications. It is not deniable that these inequalities in skills are influencing income
realities for major parts of immigrant workers. However segregation is not just a
matter of the education systems but also pervades employment sectors. Occupa-
tional segregation was basically analyzed in a paper by Bergmann in 1974.
4.2. Measurement of Occupational Segregation
The analysis of Bergmann (1974) is initially based on a labor market with two
occupations and in which all employees have the same skills. In addition, a sim-
plifying assumption is implemented, so that the marginal productivity of labor is
a linear function that is just influenced by the number of workers occupied in each
sector or firm. There are two groups of labor force specified, a minority group and a
majority group. Even though some employers would only hire the minority as far as
they accept to be paid worse than the majority in certain situations, it is assumed
that generally all workers will be paid equal to their marginal productivity.
This amounts to saying that once an employer allows the low wages of
Negroes to overcome his aversion to hiring them for a given occupation,
he will not deny himself the extra profit he can get by utilizing the labor-
intensive methods their low wages makes sensible. (Bergmann 1974,
p. 103)
The model is built on total segregation by occupation with two different marginal
productivities, meaning that one additional employed worker, creates different addi-
tional values in the two occupations. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1 by the unequal
steepness of the marginal productivity curves in the two occupations (AE and FC
respectively). Total segregation means that all workers of one group (named ma-
jority) working in one occupation (OD) and the rest of workers (called minority)
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is employed in the other one (OB). Their wages are determined by their marginal
productivity which is DE and BC respectively. Obviously the minority sector is
overcrowded because marginal productivity is lower than in the other sector and a
shift from the menial occupation to the prestige one could increase total output.
Figure 4.1.: Occupation Segregation model by Bergmann
(Source: Bergmann 1974, p. 104)
There is a crucial monetary differential in wages between the two occupations
which makes the employers indifferent in employing minority or majority workers.
This amount of money which regulates the access of the two groups of labor force
into the other occupation, is assumed to be high in prestige occupations and low
in menial ones. The whole model of segregation is stable as long as the difference
in the marginal productivities is between the crucial monetary differentials in the
menial occupation dm and in the prestige occupation dp.
dm ≤ (prestige marginal productivity) – (menial marginal productivity) ≤ dp
A difference in the marginal productivity that is bigger than dp means, that one
additive minority worker in the prestige occupation would create more value than
the employer’s aversion to employ minorities, expressed in money. In this case there
would be a shift of minority workers into the prestige sector (BS = JH). As a
result of this shift, marginal productivity and wages respectively will rise in the
menial sector (SF) and the minority labor force in the prestige sector would earn
equal wages, as this is the opportunity cost for leaving the menial sector. Normally
an additional worker in the prestige occupation would almost earn DE but JHGK
shows the size of the shift and the real wage. Drawing all possible sizes of shifts we
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get a linear curve through K and N, since N is the wage below which no minority
worker would change the sector because this is exactly the wage level they may
achieve if they would stay in their crowded occupation.
It is easy to find out what the minority’s wage in the prestige sector is, but how
will the shift affect the majority’s wages? General marginal productivity curves
are derived as a sum of the marginal productivity curves of each firm for this kind
of labor. So if some firms shift from hiring majority labor force to the minority
one, the marginal productivity curve will be the sum of all remaining firms. So if
KG minority workers entered the prestige occupation the new marginal productivity
curve will be AK as can be seen in Figure 4.2. This causes a decrease of the wage of
majority workers from DE to DM. As before, the supply curve of minority workers
in the prestige occupation is drawn through N and K and arrives at point P which
is the total supply of the majority labor force29. In this case both wage levels realize
DP and segregation would be erased. But in regard of a shift KG, the growth of
the minorities’ wages will be QL and the fall of the majorities’ wages would equal
EM. Hence a shift from the menial to the prestige occupation would cause a bigger
rise of the minority wage than the fall of the majority wage, which is quite a crucial
statement for this analysis.
Figure 4.2.: Bergmann model after shift in Labor Force
(Source: Bergmann 1974, p. 105)
Most previous debates on discrimination concentrated on the inefficiency of pre-
judices for a discriminator who is not willing to employ laborers of a certain group.
The discriminator was presumed to forgo the cheapness of these employees – for
29This point can of course only be reached, if dp equals zero.
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example blacks or women -, a cheapness which he was producing by his own behavior.
So the real gainers of discrimination were those employers who were thought to be
the least prejudiced because they could raise their profits by the low wages of the
minority group (cp. Bergmann 1974, pp. 107 et sqq.). However, in regard of
occupational segregation it can be shown that discriminators do hire blacks and
women - but preferential in menial occupations.
Bergmann adds, that the restriction of blacks and women to certain employment
sectors may have nothing to do with Becker’s ”taste for discrimination”, but is rather
a gentlemen’s agreement among employers searching for the maximization of their
profits. She argues that it is easier to have such an agreement on ”Thou shalt hire
them only as janitors” than ”Thou shalt pay them 80 cent less”.
Even though this statement sounds like a conspiracy theory, in which a mysterious
class of employers is discussing in secret halls to ban foreigners in high-paid employ-
ment, there is evidence for such behavior in Western Europe, as Ottaviano/Peri
(2008) show.
Ottaviano and Peri report three important developments on the Western Euro-
pean labor markets. An aging working class, women who are increasingly partici-
pating in the labor force and the youth that is consequently advancing its level of
education. Due to rising educational and age levels, rich countries are specializing
into high-skilled services, which is exemplified by the shift away from agricultural
and industrial labor toward the service sector. Hence there will be a tendency of
increasing demand for jobs and services which previously were provided by women
and low-educated young workers and on the other hand a lacking supply of workers
who are willing to carry them out. Such services are care of children and elderly,
cleaning, cooking, building, etc.
In many countries neighboring Western Europe, like in North Africa or in Eastern
Europe, there exists a big labor force of unskilled young workers, which could be
attracted by higher productivity and wages in Western Europe. Ottaviano/Peri
(2008) refer to the benefits of specialization and trade, which would mean that
educated Western Europeans should concentrate on human capital intensive ser-
vices (business services, finance, education, research, etc.) and immigrants should
specialize in manual-intensive services (personal care, construction, transportation,
etc.).
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Facing the differences in qualifications as pointed out shortly in 4.1 it seems plau-
sible that certain nationality groups are concentrated in few industrial sectors, which
require low levels of education and experience. Biﬄ gives evidence that Yugoslavs
mainly work in typically seasonal employments like agriculture and forestry, con-
struction and tourism, which neither require high education levels nor long-term
experience. Turkish employees are often hired in textile, wood-working, construc-
tion, chemical and metal industry while people from the EEC are represented in the
finance sector, in science and education (cp. Biffl 2002, pp. 540 et sqq.). 1999 two-
thirds of the whole foreign labor force in Austria were concentrated on 6 industrial
sectors: construction, tourism, trade, corporate-assisting services, metal industry
and communications, mainly with low average incomes. Manolakos (2006, p. 14)
explains, that the foreigner status (Ausla¨nderInnenstatus) linked with the sector
regimentation usual is the cause for occupational placement in certain sectors and
employment segments, which often are at the bottom of the earning pyramid.
In Appendix A.5 a list of the industrial sectors and the shares of immigrants in the
corresponding sector are presented. Moreover the sector median wages compared
to the total median wage are listed. The highlighted rows show some distinctive
correlations between the share of foreigners and the median wages. Obviously im-
migrants are rather crowded in sectors with low pay, such as agriculture (especially
farmhands), tourism (hotels), textiles and leather production.
4.3. The Process of Assimilation
However, there is a certain counterpart of segregation, which is assimilation. This
means that newly arrived immigrants earn less than comparable natives, but after
some years of residence, earnings reach the level of native incomes. The most com-
mon paper on this issue was published by Chiswick (1978). Chiswick analyzes
the effect of ”americanization” on the earning of foreign-born men in the United
States30.
Chiswick states, that besides productivity there are some important factors which
have an impact on the wage level, like an occupational license to apply the skills
acquired in the country of origin, a school degree or a union card. It’s likely, that
30Chiswick only analyzes whites to avoid a confounding of the effects of ethnicity and foreign origin
on earnings.
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new immigrants often cannot fulfill these characteristics due to lack of knowledge
of the customs and language problems. But as time passes, immigrants gain more
knowledge of the host country and so they may receive all these important charac-
teristics.
As times passes, however, the immigrant gains knowledge of the United
States, acquires job-specific training, and either acquires the union card
or modifies his skills accordingly. Thus, because of knowledge and skills
are not perfectly mobile across countries, other things the same, immi-
grants initially would have earnings significantly lower than native-born
persons, but the gap would narrow the longer they are in the United
States. The initial earnings deficiency, and the steepness of the subse-
quent rise in earnings, would be smaller the grater the similarity between
the country of origin and the United States. (Chiswick 1978, p. 899)
Thus, the amount of years passed since migration would be less important for
Canadians than for Germans, Chiswick adds. Another problem that occurs is that
employers are often not familiar to foreign education systems. Hence, they have
less information about the productivity of a job applicant who recently immigrated
compared with a native person with similar general statistics. It is difficult to
investigate schooling and previous employment references of foreigners and combine
them with the actual productivity expectancy for a worker.
Further Chiswick states, that the effect of citizenship could be a parameter of
considerable interest. Wage effects of occupational segregation or direct discrimina-
tion in wages could lower the income of foreigners compared to naturalized citizens.
However, this should not be a decisive earnings disadvantage.
Based on these considerations Chiswick defines several hypotheses which could be
tested. (1) As far as some aspects of schooling are country specific, a year of schooling
prior to immigration has a smaller effect on earnings than a year of schooling for
a native. (2) The same issue turns out to be true for the matter of labor market
experience. (3) As immigrants initially have less human capital specific to the host
country than natives, their earnings are smaller. (4) After the arrival, their earnings
rise at a faster rate than the wages of natives, since immigrants acquire experience
in the host country and make investments in post-school training. (5) For the same
number of years in the host country, whether a foreign-born person is an alien or a
naturalized citizen has no effect on earnings.
40
In his analysis Chiswick works with the 1970 Census of Population, 5 percent
questionnaire. The sample contains white men, aged 25-64 in 1970 who worked
at least one week in 1969 and who reported earnings from wages, salary or self-
employment. The analysis indicates that white male immigrants do initially have
lower earnings, but they rise rapidly, particularly during their first few years in the
host country. Chiswick calculates, that after 10 to 15 years, immigrant earnings
equal and then even exceed wages of natives. Moreover the effect of citizenship
turns out to be just a matter of the amount of years since migration. Naturalized
citizens have generally spent more years in the host country than aliens.
Arai/Vilhelmsson (2001) investigate the assimilation theory for unemployment
risks in Sweden. The authors state, that the gap in unemployment risks between
immigrants and natives narrows quite fast in the first years after immigration, but
is rather constant after seven or eight years of residence in Sweden. Hence, the
convergence pattern for unemployment risks is similar to the pattern for income
gaps. Once more, mostly non-Europeans are substantially affected by this gap. Non-
Europeans may be able to reduce their unemployment risk to the level of natives,
however only those who stay in Sweden for more than 20 years.
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5. Data and Variables in EU-SILC
2005
The analysis of labor market inequalities by ethnic origin is more difficult
due to the fact that explicit collection of data on race is illegal in many
OECD countries, which restrains enormously the number of countries
for which racial disparities can be observed and racial gaps computed.
(OECD 2008, p. 147)
This chapter describes the data set in detail and intends to highlight
the problems of availability of information on the discrimination issue.
In general, research often is confined by the limited existence of data
and variables, this turns out to be true for labor market analysis as
well. Further, this section introduces the endogenous and all exogenous
variables of the model.
Due to scarce availability of income data by assets and investments the analysis
of inequality is often based on wages and salaries, which still account on some 70
percent of aggregate income. Unfortunately the best source of wage data in Austria
- the income tax dataset - does not provide various social variables, like nationality,
origin of birth or any information on educational careers. If one compares the
data basis of the studies cited in Chapter 3.4, where most economists could use
official data records, the supply in Austria is very poor. Appendix A.2 gives a short
overview on the different datasets which offer information on personal incomes (cp.
Zwickl 2008). Moreover, for the research on the descendants of immigrants there is
no data available. As Herzog-Punzenberger (2003, p. 1126) states, ”there is no
statistical information in Austria on the parents’ first language, former citizenship,
or place of birth. It is thus very difficult to make any reliable statement about the size
of the second generation in Austria.”31. For reasons of availability and the plenty
31The OECD does some research on the second generation in countries, where data is available,
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of variables, the EU-SILC 2005 offers a good base for further research.
5.1. Description of the Dataset EU-SILC 2005
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (further EU-SILC)
is a survey carried out in private households with its central focuses on income, em-
ployment, living, health and financial conditions (cp. Statistik Austria 2007a,
p. 21). The population of the survey are private households with at least one house-
hold member aged 16 or older. EU-SILC replaced the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP) which was conceived as a sole panel survey. Since the last panel
wave of the ECHP in 2001, no data on income and living conditions was collected on
a European scale (cp. Statistik Austria 2007b, p. 5). The EU-SILC project was
started with a regulation of the European Parliament in June 2003, pursuing the
objective of a standardized survey for comparable analysis of economic conditions
in European households. In its regulation the European Parliament states:
Comparability of data between Member States shall be a fundamental
objective and shall be pursued through the development of methodolog-
ical studies from the outset of EU-SILC data collection, carried out in
close cooperation between the Member States and Eurostat. (European
Parliament 2003a, p. 2)
The implementation of the survey is statutorily compulsive for all members of
the European Union since 2004. Only Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands
were allowed to start the procedure in 2005. Since this point of time, all countries
within the European Union carry out these statistics on income and living conditions
(cp. Figure 5.1). The survey should cover 80,000 households throughout Europe
for the cross-sectional and 60,000 households for the longitudinal inquiry. This
represents 156,000 individuals and 116,500 respectively. For Austria the prescribed
number of households is 4,500 (8,750 individuals) for the cross-sectional and 3,250
(6,250 individuals) for the longitudinal survey with a response rate of 60 percent
(cp. European Parliament 2003a, p. 9).
In 2004 the first integrated cross-sectional and longitudinal survey period was
started in Austria with a rotation principle, which means that each year one fourth
cp. OECD 2008, p. 149
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Figure 5.1.: History of Pan-European Surveys
1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999  2000   2001   2002  2003   2004   2005   2006    2007
ECHP starts in European Community (without Austria and Finland)
Austria joins the European Union and starts ECHP
As the last EU member, Finland starts ECHP
Final panel wave of ECHP
Regulation of the European Parliament to initiate EU-SILC:
First cross-sectional survey in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg and Norway
EU15 (without Germany, Great Britain and Netherlands) and 
Norway, Estonia and Iceland conduct EU-SILC integrated 
cross-sectional and longitudinal survey
 EU25, Norway and Iceland participate in the EU-SILC
Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey join the EU-SILC project
Switzerland starts to conduct the survey
ECHP EU-SILC
(Source: Statistik Austria 2007b, own illustration)
of the sample is selected newly, the other three fourths remain the same. Thus, out
of the 5,624 households that formed the original sample of EU-SILC 2004, exactly
3,498 were chosen for the second time and 2,126 were debut-households. All new
households were selected randomly out of the Austrian register of residence. The
response rate of the first inquiry wave in 2005 was lower than 60 percent so that
the rotation group of 2004 was again included into the sample, adding up to 8,494
households in the gross sample. Thereof 111 addresses didn’t exist any more and
147 couldn’t be contacted successfully. Finally 5,148 households were interrogated
out of the remaining sample, representing 13,043 persons whereof 10,419 aged 16 or
older (cp. Statistik Austria 2007a, pp. 66 et sqq.).
There are two kinds of errors that are almost inevitable in any survey: sampling
errors and measurement errors. A sampling error marks the difference in the value
given by the survey sample and the according real value for the whole population.
Obviously these errors decrease as the sample size grows. A measurement error
is the difference between the measured value and the real -but unknown- value of
one and the same variable. These errors may be caused by the questionnaire, the
interviewer or the respondent.
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To minimize such measurement errors, the data ascertainment was conducted via
the Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI), which made it possible to
avoid inconsistency of answers right during the interviews. CAPI announces errors
and warnings. Errors occur, if the input value is absolutely impossible in regard of
previous specifications, for example if more children than the total number of house-
hold members are declared. Warnings are announced, if the input seems implausible,
like 3,000 euros in unemployment compensation (cp. Statistik Austria 2007b,
p. 11). Other implausible and inconsistent answers were checked with telephone calls
after tests on extreme values and densities. Moreover 2,550 of the 10,419 household
members were never interviewed personally. The information source for these 24
percent were so-called proxy interviews with other household members.
5.2. An Outline of the Dependent Variable
Even though information about the disposable income was collected on a household
as well as on an individual level, this work concentrates on the latter issue. There
are several variables on an individual’s income collected in the EU-SILC 2005 (cp.
European Parliament 2003b, p. 3). Reference period for the declaration of all
income components was the calendar year 2004, thus all income variables are annual
data.
As it is defined by the European Parliament, the components of an employee gross
income can be broken down to gross cash or near-cash employee income (variable
py010g), gross non-cash employee income (variable py020g) and employers’ social
insurance contributions (variable py030g). It is important for the computation of
wage regressions to know what kind of income is taken into account on the left
side of the equation. The second type of income mentioned above can be seen as
non-monetary transfers which are provided for free or cheaper to employees, like
company cars, free or subsidized meals and so on. The third component of gross
income includes the employer’s contributions into the social security of the employee
such as retirement, health and life insurance.
Without doubt employers who may discriminate workers of a minority group could
perform their preferential treatment in form of paying out non-monetary assets.
They could offer company cars only to members of the majority group while the
other group would have to pay for petrol to get to work. But in case of measuring
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discrimination this is hard to quantify. In the legislation there does not exist any
kind of juristic claim on company cars and it just depends on the arbitrariness of
the employer’s will to supply employees with vehicles. No judge would support a
punishment against an employer who is not willing to supply a car to get to the
workplace. We will stick to the concept of equal pay for equal work and thus require
the first type of income.
Even though it can not be rejected that the latter two definitions are clearly a
source of income (or discrimination) to employees we are concentrating our analysis
on the first type of income which predominantly is wages and salaries paid in cash
for time worked. The following definition of included components in gross cash
employee income is given by the European Parliament:
Table 5.1.: Components of the EU-SILC Variable Gross Cash Income
wages and salaries paid in cash for time
worked or work done in main and any sec-
ondary or casual job(s)
enhanced rates of pay for overtime
remuneration for time not worked (e.g. holi-
day payments)
piece rate payments
payments for fostering children commissions, tips and gratuities
supplementary payments (e.g. 13th month
payment)
profit-sharing and bonuses paid in cash
additional payments based on productivity allowances paid for working in remote loca-
tions (regarded as part of the conditions of
the job)
allowances for transport to or from work fees paid to directors of incorporated enter-
prises
additional payments made by employers to
their employees or former employees and
other eligible persons to supplement the sick,
disability, maternity leave or survivors’ pay
entitlement from social insurance schemes,
where such payments cannot be separately
and clearly identified as social benefits
payments made by employers to an employee
in lieu of wages and salaries through a so-
cial insurance scheme when unable to work
through sickness, disability or maternity leave
where such payment cannot be separately and
clearly identified as social benefits
(Source: European Parliament 2003b, p. 4)
All the income data was demanded on an annual or on a monthly basis. If
respondents could not or were not willing to reveal their exact income, they were
asked to point on a certain level on an income range chart. The monthly gross
income could be categorized into 15 classes ranging from ”1-600” to ”8,001 and
more” euros.
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For instance, 47 percent seized the possibility to declare their income out of in-
vestments (dividends, savings book, building loan contract, stocks and bonds, etc.)
in form of classification in categories. The alternative to such charts would be an in-
creasing probability of non-response and missing important information on income.
As there are many variables on income, several values were missing in the raw data.
Missing net income values are imputed in EU-SILC, missing gross income values are
computed using net-gross-conversion. A detailed description about the imputation
of income data into EU-SILC is given by Statistik Austria (2007b, pp. 13 et
sqq.). While in EU-SILC 2004 approximately 20 percent of employee income were
imputed, in 2005 this value could be reduced to 3 percent, especially due to some
changes in the questionnaire, which is again documented by Statistik Austria
(2007a, pp. 77 et sqq.) and Statistik Austria (2007b, pp. 25 et sqq.). Among
other things these changes led to an increase of the disposable household income
of about 8 percent compared to EU-SILC 2004, which is definitely not reflecting
real income growth in Austria. A second reason for this issue is that households
with lower income had a lower probability to continue their participation in the
longitudinal survey.
A comparison of the Austrian income tax dataset with the income data of EU-
SILC may reveal if the survey is representative for the earnings of the population.
The income tax dataset contains the earnings of all employees and retirees and is
therefore the most important source for individuals’ income in Austria. Figure 5.2
shows a comparison by means of the annual gross income at the decile points. It
can be seen that EU-SILC overrates earnings below the median and undervalues
high incomes. One reason for this could be, that people with very low as well as
people with very high incomes are not willing to give an insight into their financial
situation. Especially poor people could be embarrassed to reveal their real level of
poverty and often there is the prevailing opinion that poverty is just a temporary
state. Altogether the EU-SILC data offer a good coverage of the real earnings.
In most literature, wage regressions are carried out with the logarithmic hourly
earnings, as it is suggested by the standard Mincer earnings equation32. As in EU-
SILC only gross annual payroll is available, the hourly wage is computed by dividing
gross annual payroll (py010g) by 52 weeks and then by the amount of working hours
per week (p037010 ). To be able to compare wages, we are only interested in full
32The Mincer model will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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Figure 5.2.: Comparison of Annual Gross Income in EU-SILC 2005 and Income
Tax Data 2004
Number of Persons, who draw an Income below the Decile Points. Both data sources correspond to the income in 2004.
(Source: Zwickl 2008)
time workers, that were employed in each month between January and December
2004 (p040010 to p040120 ). Finally there are 3,414 workers with an income beyond
zero and who declare themselves as full time workers (p001010 ). Thereof 3,001 are
Austrians, 350 are foreigners from EU10 and Third States and 63 are from the EU15,
as is shown in Table 5.2. We separate the EU15 from all other foreign countries due
to their special role on the labor market, as discussed in Chapter 4. Finally we
derive the natural logarithm of the wages to get our endogenous variable.
Table 5.2.: Summary Statistics of the Hourly Wages in EU-SILC 2005
Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum
Austrians 3,001 14.61449 9.023429 0.1057837 128.7046
Foreigners 350 11.47068 5.792587 0.6730769 59.02367
EU15 63 20.3935 12.03541 3.076923 71.63572
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
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5.3. The Exogenous Variables of the Model
5.3.1. Origin of birth
For the purpose of this work, another important indicator for the robustness of the
EU-SILC is the share of immigrants in the dataset. Contrary to the income data of
EU-SILC, which can be compared with data of the same year, the available census
data is only on-hand for the year 2001 or 2007. Hence, there could be a bias between
the collected data and the real figures but we presume this error to be negligible.
Statistik Austria provides following information for the year 2007: 7,062,641 Aus-
trians (85.1 percent), 240,217 from the EU15 (2.89 percent), 179,800 from the
EU10 (2.17 percent), 375,191 Yugoslavs (4.52 percent) and 154,705 Turks (1.86 per-
cent). The weighted EU-SILC dataset contains 5,798,354 Austrians (86.36 percent),
161,825 persons from the EU15 (2.41 percent), 148,562 from the EU10 (2.21 per-
cent), 346,865 Yugoslavs (5.16 percent) and 107,203 Turks (1.60 percent)33. Hence
the shares of the different nationalities in the EU-SILC seem to be more or less
representative for the Austrian population, neglecting the slight differences due to
an over-representation of Austrians.
5.3.2. Education level and labor market experience
A central statement of the human capital theory is that wage payments may depend
on individual education level which is supposed to have a positive impact on salaries.
Therefore we introduce a variable for testing if education has unequal influences
on wages for Austrians and foreigners. Moreover, human capital theory implies
that labor market experience has a positive relation with wages. In a comment on
Jacob Mincer, Rosenzweig/Morgan (1976) state, that the sole use of age and
age squared rather than work experience and experience squared in the structural
equation creates a differential bias in the estimated returns to schooling. The authors
argue, that ”age is not a good proxy for work experience since people of the same age
who have spent a different number of years in school will also have different levels
of labor force experience” (cp. Rosenzweig/Morgan 1976, p. 4). In this study,
the extend of labor market experience will be measured with the number of years in
33Note: In both cases, the matter of fact is the country of birth and not the citizenship.
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employment. It is assumed that working experience is rather a parabolic function
than a linear one, which means that the extend of experience increases a lot at the
beginning of the career and flattens with time. This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
EU-SILC 2005 provides data for both variables, education and labor market ex-
perience. On the one hand the highest educational level is recorded (p118000 ), on
the other hand the number of years in employment is available (p033000 ). EU-SILC
offers a detailed list of possible schooling careers, however the most interesting ques-
tion is, if a degree in secondary school or university has unequal impact on wage of
different nationality groups.
5.3.3. Other individual characteristics
Other individual characteristics that are introduced into the model are the sex of
a person, a leading or important position in the company and a recent job change.
The leading position in the enterprise is difficult to characterize, however in EU-
SILC 2005 there was a question whether workers have to follow the participant’s
orders (p020010 ) which is assumed to be a leading position. Moreover a variable
that records a job change in the past twelve months (p034000 ) is available in the
questionnaire. To reveal which influence this variable should have on wages, a simple
statistics on the most affected layers of workers is offered in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3.: Job change and workers’ characteristics
Skilled Unskilled Leading Position No Lead. Pos. Total
Absolute Numbers 105 235 80 260 340
In Percent 30.88 69.12 23.53 76.47 100
A leading position in an enterprise means to be in charge of a number of employees, to be skilled means at least a
graduation in secondary school (Austrian Matura).
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
Obviously most job changes are taking place among low-skilled workers who are
not in a leading position within their company. 46.7% of the skilled workers say
that the reason for the job change was an improvement of the employment, while
this is true for 40.0% of the unskilled workers. This could be taken as a case where
a job change means an improvement in wages. But whereas only 25.7% of the
skilled workers were sacked directly by the employer or due to the end of reprieved
employment contracts, some 34.0% of unskilled laborers lost their job this way and
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had to change. In these cases a job change hardly is combined with an improvement
in income. As mainly unskilled workers are affected by job changes we expect
the regression coefficient to have a negative impact on wages. Of course a leading
position should have a positive sign, being female should have a negative influence
on wages.
5.3.4. Structural characteristics
However, the wage level is not only influenced by individual characteristics but
also by structural attributes. Therefore a dummy for population agglomeration is
introduced. Agglomeration is a contiguous set of local areas, each of which has a
density superior to 500 inhabitants per square kilometer, where the total population
for the set is at least 50,000 inhabitants.
Table 5.4.: Summary Statistics of the Individual and Structural Char-
acteristics
Austria EU15 EU10 Fm. Yugoslavia Turkey
Sex 0.5210 0.6042 0.6443 0.4944 0.4594
Secondary School 0.1567 0.2000 0.2938 0.0939 0.0540
University Degree 0.0785 0.2978 0.1494 0.0223 0.0202
Agglomeration 0.2557 0.4680 0.6134 0.5861 0.5608
Job Change 0.0315 0.0297 0.0154 0.0425 0.0608
Leading Position 0.1882 0.1957 0.1391 0.0917 0.1081
Firm Size 0.2048 0.1744 0.1804 0.2550 0.2635
Labor Market Experience 20.18 18.08 17.42 17.89 16.00
Skilled Job 0.2091 0.2042 0.1494 0.1252 0.0675
Parental Education 0.0680 0.2042 0.1752 0.0201 0.0202
Note: All variables are dummies, apart from labor market experience which is measured in years
(Sources: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
To test on the effects of generational mobility the parental education level is
included in the calculations. This dummy equals 1 if one parent owns a degree in
secondary school (Matura) or higher. Another dummy surveys the required skill for
the sector in which the participant is employed. High skilled sectors are supposed
to be human capital intensive, low skilled industries are assumed to be manual labor
intensive. A list with all branches can be found in Appendix A.5. Finally there is a
dummy on firm size included, which equals 1 if more than 50 workers are employed
51
in the participant’s company. All these dummy variables are expected to have a
positive influence on the wage levels.
The summary statistics for all the described variables and all nationalities are
provided in Table 5.4. In the further calculations the group of foreigners will be
sum up apart from the EU15-citizen.
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6. The Decomposition Model
[The] analysis of earnings differentials is based on the assumption that
in the absence of discrimination, the estimated effects of workers endow-
ments on earnings are identical for immigrants and natives. Discrimi-
nation is therefore revealed by differences in the estimated coefficients.
(Golder 2000, p. 3)
In this section the statistical methods for the measurement of wage dis-
crimination are discussed. Starting with the derivation of the wage re-
gression model by Jacob Mincer the base for a decomposition of income
differentials is developed. Furthermore, the two statistical approaches
of Alan Blinder and Richard Oaxaca are described and the conceptual
framework for the own calculations is defined.
6.1. The Mincer Type Wage Equation
The implication that an individual’s schooling may be the explanation of the pro-
ductivity augmenting effect of education is not as clear as it seems, because schooling
and education are not synonymous. As Mincer (1974) points out:
The educational content of time spent at school ranges from superb to
miserable. The absorption of learning and marketability of knowledge
and of skills acquired through learning also differ a great deal among
individuals, places, and times. Moreover, school is neither the only nor
necessarily the most important training ground for shaping market pro-
ductivities. (Mincer 1974, p. 1)
Nevertheless there exists evidence of significant differences in average earnings
among groups with varying schooling. Anyway, schooling as a sort of investment
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in people is costly in time and money, expressed by the deferral of earnings, the
reduction of the span of ones working life and the direct money outlays to consume
education. As far as the length of earnings life is concerned, it is normally supposed
that each year spent with education reduces earning life by one year. A controversial
interpretation is given by Mincer (1974, p. 7), who states, that more educated
people retire later but the length of earning life is approximately constant among
all different levels of education. This hypothesis of Mincer may be compared with
Table 6.1, where the retirees in EU-SILC 2005 are listed by education level and
working life-span.
Table 6.1.: Education and Number of
Years employed
Observations Mean
Apprenticeship 1,291 27.357
Advance Training (1) 164 36.420
Secondary School (2) 125 20.008
Vocational School (3) 180 26,600
University Degree 160 23.675
PhD Degree 24 32.666
(1) Meisterausbildung (2) Allgemeinbildende Ho¨here Schule (3)
Berufsbildende Ho¨here Schule
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
Hence, according to Mincer, this cost of schooling is not the crucial one not to
invest into education. What is more important is the deferral of earnings since the
cost of postponing wages for an additional year is higher than the present cost of
reducing the wage by one year some decades in the future. This is definitely true for
many working class and immigrant families which therefore are forcing their children
to start apprenticeship earlier.
The schooling model by Mincer denotes:
Vs = Ys
n∑
t=s+1
(
1
1 + r
)t (6.1)
where s is the amount of schooling years, n is the working life including the length
of schooling. Vs is the present value of an individual’s lifetime earning at the start
of schooling, Ys are the annual earnings, r is the discount rate and t the time in
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years. After the mathematical remodeling of the function it can be derived, that the
percentage increase of earnings is strictly proportional to the time spent in schooling
with the discounted rate of return as the coefficient, denoted as
lnYs = lnY0 + rs (6.2)
According to Mincer, this is the most primitive form of a human capital earnings
function, if we restrict the investment in human capital to s years of schooling
and no further education beyond this age. Many economists estimate the rate of
return of investment in schooling on approximately seven per cent for each year of
education34 even though Mincer (1974, p. 44) shows, that this is controversially
discussed. However this very simple model is not able to explain differentials among
individuals who derived other forms of investment in human capital.
As we see, Mincer takes the logarithm of earnings instead of the wage levels.
Following Lemieux (2006), Mincer argued that investments in human capital are
only realized if the rate of return, and not the absolute return, of one more unit of
education exceeds the discount rate of the money put into it. Hence there is not
only an econometric idea backing the use of the logarithm but also a theoretical
rationale.
It may be noted, that Mincer developed a more complex model to include several
levels of education, going beyond the mere education in school. Hence, in period t
the function of the potential earnings Et denotes
Et = [
t−1∏
j=0
(1 + kj · pj)]E0 (6.3)
where kt is the amount of time devoted to training
35 and pt is the return to training
or schooling. If life time is divided into two periods, whereof one is schooling years
and the other is post school training, the return to education pt splits up into ps
in school and p0 in training activities. It is easy to derive the potential earnings
function in t as follows:
34see Psacharopoulos/Patrinos (2004)
35kt = 1 when person is in school
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Et = [
t−1∏
j=s
(1 + kj · p0)](1 + ps)s · E0 (6.4)
where (1+ps)
s ·E0 equals Es which is the potential earnings for s schooling years.
By taking the logarithm of (6.4) we get
lnEt = lnE0 + s · ps + p0 ·
t−1∑
j=s
kj. (6.5)
Moreover a term for potential experience X, as an exogenous rate of capital
accumulation beyond school completion, is introduced with t = T−s = X. Equation
(6.5) can finally be written as the seminal Mincer wage regression:
ln(w(s, x)) = α0 + ps · S + β0 ·X + β1 ·X2 (6.6)
where α0 is the rental price of human capital and the level of ability, ps is the return
to schooling, β0 and β1 define the return to experience
36, S are the years of schooling
and X denotes the years of post school training respectively. The involvement of
the squared experience term investigates if post-school human capital accumulation
is slowing down with time.
The process of investment in human capital is not restricted to schooling
and job training. Much of it takes place in the home, particularly during
the preschool stage of the life cycle, as well as later. In empirical studies
of intergenerational influences on educational attainments it has been
found that the education of parents is a significant variable. This may
be interpreted as evidence either of the transmission of parental tastes
and motivations or of the greater propensity of more educated parents to
invest in the education of their children, or both. (Mincer 1974, p. 140)
There is some discussion if the Mincer wage regression of 1958 is still appropriate
for actual analysis of earnings. Lemieux (2006) proves the actuality of the Mincer
model. Hence, as far as the effects of education on earnings are concerned we will
36A negative β1 reflects the concavity of the age earnings profile
56
use the traditional Mincer type earnings function.
6.2. Structural Wage Decomposition by Blinder
The common estimation used by Blinder (1973) to search for the characteristics
of wage differentials denotes
Yi = β0 +
n∑
j=1
βjXji + ui (6.7)
where Yi are the incomes or earnings and X1i to Xni are the observable character-
istics of individual i. Blinder points out that the proper dependent variable Y is the
hourly wage rate. As we are interested in computing this equation for two different
groups, a high-wage group of natives (N) and a low-wage group of foreigners (F), it
is obvious that
∑
j
βNj X¯
N
j −
∑
j
βFj X¯
F
j (6.8)
is the part of the equation that defines the wage differential on the basis of the
average personal characteristics, which are now represented by the mean value X¯j.
But there is still a term in the differential that cannot be explained by the personal
properties denoting βN0 −βF0 which is generally assigned to discrimination. By adding
and subtracting
∑
j β
N
j X¯
F
j respectively, Phrase 6.8 can easily be converted into
∑
j
βNj (X¯
N
j − X¯Fj ) +
∑
j
X¯Fj (β
N
j − βFj ) (6.9)
The first term denotes the gain in endowments of Austrians compared to the
characteristics of foreigners and it’s evaluation by the high-wage group’s wage equa-
tion. The second term, which could also be considered as discrimination, shows
the ”difference between how the high-wage equation would value the characteris-
tics of the low-wage group and how the low-wage equation actually values them”
(Blinder 1973, p. 438). This measures, if identical endowments and qualifications
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are treated different by the labor market, depending on the worker’s nationality.
So with this set of equations we are able to decompose wage estimations into
a term that is attributable to differing endowments and another term that exists
due to varying treatment of members of different demographic groups. In summary
Blinder specifies the terms with letters to simplify the model as follows:
Table 6.2.: Components of the Decomposition Model by Blinder
Description Term
R Raw differential βN0 +
∑
j β
N
j X¯
N
j −(βF0 +
∑
j β
F
j X¯
F
j ) = E+C+U
E Portion of differential attributable to
differing endowments
∑
j β
N
j (X¯
N
j − X¯Fj )
C Portion of differential attributable to
differing coefficients
∑
j X¯
F
j (β
N
j − βFj )
U Unexplained portion of the differential βN0 − βF0
D Portion of the differential attributable
to discrimination
C + U
(Source: Blinder 1973 : 439, own illustration)
Besides the statistical computation of the decomposition model, Blinder gives
some suggestions for the items in the endowments matrix, as ”correlation does not
imply causation” (Blinder 1973, p. 441). The proposed framework for the estima-
tion contains age, education, occupation, union membership, job experience, health,
geographical mobility and some more. The choice of items that are used in our
model are discussed in Chapter 5.
To provide some perception of the concept of wage decomposition we will introduce
an example which was computed with the statistical software R37. For the dissection
of the regression a dummy variable ”foreigner” was created with the values 1 for
foreigners and 0 for Austrians. The code can be seen in the Appendix A.7 and
describes the decomposition of a wage regression that only depends on one single
variable, which is age. The results are illustrated in Table 6.3.
37R is a free software environment for statistical computing and graphics: http://www.r-
project.org
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Table 6.3.: Wage Decomposition by Nationality with Statisti-
cal Software R
Endowments Coefficients Shift Raw Discrimination
0.003933644 -0.04080975 0.2653503 0.2284742 0.2245405
(Source: EU-SILC, own calculation)
The result of this theoretical example would mean a contribution of the endow-
ments to the raw differential (0.2653) of 0.0039 points or approximately 1.7 percent.
The rest of the differential can be divided into two portions. First, a lack of ex-
planatory variables which could describe the wage. Second, the differences in the
coefficients which is equal to discrimination. Therefore the interpretation of the
results of wage decompositions is not easy. The crucial question is, how much of
the differential is really caused by discrimination and how much is caused by the
incompleteness of the explanatory variables.
6.3. The Statistical Approach of Oaxaca
A similar statistical approach is given by Oaxaca (1973). On the basis of the
gender wage gap, he introduces the concept of a discrimination coefficient D:
D =
Wm/Wf − (Wm/Wf )0
(Wm/Wf )0
, (6.10)
where (Wm/Wf ) is the observed male-female wage ratio and (Wm/Wf )
0 is the wage
ratio in the absence of discrimination. The discrimination coefficient in Equation
6.10 is simply Becker’s generalized measure for discrimination (cp. Chapter 3) di-
vided by the wage ratio in absence of discrimination. This can also be formulated
as a logarithmic function.
ln(D + 1) = ln(Wm/Wf )− ln(Wm/Wf )0. (6.11)
In a non-discriminating labor market, employers will minimize their costs and pay
out the marginal products of male and females, denoting MPm and MPf .(
Wm
Wf
)0
=
MPm
MPf
(6.12)
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Since (Wm/Wf )
0 is unknown, the estimation of the discrimination coefficient D is
equivalent to estimating (Wm/Wf )
0. Hence, Oaxaca defines a wage equation that is
estimated separately for each group, which yields
ln(Wi) = Z
′
iβ + ui, i = 1, ..., n (6.13)
where Wi is the hourly wage rate of the i-th person, Z
′
i is a vector of individual
characteristics, β is a vector of coefficients and ui is a disturbance term. Oaxaca
denotes the average hourly wages for males and females W¯m and W¯f respectively
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and lets the wage differential denote
G =
W¯m − W¯f
W¯f
(6.14)
ln(G+ 1) = ln(W¯m)− ln(W¯f ) (6.15)
By means of an ordinary least squares estimation we easily derive equations 6.16
and 6.17 which can be substituted in equation 6.15.
ln(W¯m) = Z¯
′
m βˆm (6.16)
ln(W¯f ) = Z¯
′
f βˆf (6.17)
ln(G+ 1) = Z¯ ′m βˆm − Z¯ ′f βˆf . (6.18)
Let ∆Z¯ ′ be the difference between the vectors of mean values of the regressors for
males and females
∆Z¯ ′ = Z¯ ′m − Z¯ ′f (6.19)
and let ∆βˆ be the difference between the corresponding vectors of estimated coeffi-
cients
∆βˆ = βˆf − βˆm (6.20)
then it can easily be shown that
ln(G+ 1) = ∆Z¯ ′ βˆf − Z¯ ′m ∆βˆ. (6.21)
Finally Oaxaca ends by yielding the two expressions for the decomposition of the
wage differential into the estimated effects of differences in individual characteristics
38which is simply the geometric mean W¯ = exp
{[
n∑
i=1
ln(Wt)
]
/n
}
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and the estimated effects of discrimination.
ln
(
Ŵm
Wf
)0
= ∆Z¯ ′m βˆf (6.22)
ln(D̂ + 1) = −Z¯ ′m ∆βˆ. (6.23)
Hence the similarities to the considerations of Blinder are obvious. In equation
6.22 the differences between the individual and structural characteristics of the two
groups are weighted with the coefficients of the low wage group. These difference
should point out the wage gap due to disparities in schooling, experience, etc. and
equals of course the wage ratio in the absence of discrimination (Wm/Wf )
0. In
equation 6.23 the differences in the coefficients are weighted by the characteristics
in the high wage group and is therefore denoted as discrimination.
6.4. The Index-Number Problem
It is obvious that a different weighting of Blinders equations leads to varying results,
a so-called index-number problem. In equation 6.9 the differences in endowments
are evaluated by the non-discriminated high wage structure and the differences in
coefficients are weighted by the endowments of the discriminated group. Since an
exchange of the weights between discriminated and non-discriminated group ap-
parently does modify the results, the question arises, which group of both is the
reference group that is non-discriminated.
Blinder states, that instead of using∑
j
βNj (X¯
N
j − X¯Fj )
he could equally well have evaluated the differences in endowments by using the
low-wage equation, which would yield
∑
j
βFj (X¯
N
j − X¯Fj ). (6.24)
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The question arises which of the two equations to use in empirical work. In
general they will yield different answers, and in some cases they are far apart (cp.
Neumark 1988, p. 281). However, Blinder mentions that there is no right and
wrong answer here. Thus an alternative formulation of equation 6.9 leaves as a
residual
(Y¯ N − Y¯ F )−
∑
j
βFj (X¯
N
j − X¯Fj ) =
βN0 − βF0 +
∑
j
X¯Fj (β
N
j − βFj ) +
∑
j
(X¯Nj − X¯Fj ) · (βNj − βj) (6.25)
The first two terms may obviously be attributed to differences in the coefficients,
while the latter term has no definite interpretation as long as no reference group is
defined39. Several economists had various proposals how to handle this interaction
term.
Reimers (1983) proposed to use the mean coefficients between the low and the
high model, while Cotton (1988) suggested to weight the coefficients by group size,
i.e. the relative proportion of subjects in the high group. Finally, Neumark 1988
proposed another solution for the problem. Referring to Oaxaca the two different
equations for [n]atives and [f]oreigners yield
ln(w¯n)− ln(w¯f ) = ∆X¯ ′bn + X¯ ′f∆b, (6.26)
ln(w¯n)− ln(w¯f ) = ∆X¯ ′bf + X¯ ′n∆b, (6.27)
where ∆X¯ ′ = X¯ ′n − X¯ ′f and ∆b = bn − bf . In equation 6.26 it is assumed that
in the absence of discrimination the native wage structure would prevail, since the
coefficients of the native wage structure are used to weight the differences in char-
acteristics. In equation 6.27 it is obviously the other way round and the foreigner
wage structure is taken as the reference. Hence, Neumark proposed a pooled model
over both groups denoting
39See calculations in Appendix A.6.
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ln(w¯n)− ln(w¯f ) = ∆X¯ ′b+
[
X¯ ′n(bn − b)− X¯ ′f (bf − b)
]
, (6.28)
where b is the non-discriminated wage structure40. The pooled model approach
to the wage rate as is explained in Neumark (1988) will be included in the decom-
position results in Chapter 7.
40As stated before, Reimers (1983) proposed an equal distribution between both groups, which
would mean b = 0.5 ∗ bn + 0.5 ∗ bf .
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7. Empirical Results with
EU-SILC 2005
Although inequality has long been topic of intense interest to sociologists,
few have bothered to carefully specify what they mean by the term. It is
easy, of course, to distinguish perfect equality from a state of inequality.
But given two different, unequal distributions of some social reward, how
does one decide which distribution is the more unequal?
(Allison 1978, p. 865)
In this chapter the results of the empirical study with EU-SILC 2005 are
presented. The ethnic wage gap is analyzed with several measures for
income inequality. Further the sources and implications of labor market
discrimination in Austria are examined.
7.1. Distribution of Incomes
In Figure 7.1 the distribution of wages of Austrians and immigrants from EU10 and
Third States are shown. Within the group of foreigners a stronger concentration
of incomes in the lower wage area especially below the tax free income allowance
of 10,000 Euro may be recognized. The small peak on the left side indicates a
relatively high number of workers in precarious or marginal employment. This may
be attributed to the strong representation in the low wage sectors of the economy,
as it was stated in Chapter 3.
The curve of Austrians begins flatter and increases more slowly. All in all the
frequency distribution of Austrian wages is more centered than the one of immigrants
which leads to a higher mean and median values. Moreover the downturn within
Austrians is less steep and lasts as long as to some 80,000 Euro. Immigrants from
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EU10 and Third States are not significantly present in this wage group.
Figure 7.1.: Frequency Distribution of Austrian and Immigrant Gross Income
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(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
7.2. Basic analysis of the Income Data
The simplest measures of inequality in earnings are comparisons of the median and
the mean between different groups. The median represents the wage of the person in
the very middle of the sample, the mean shows the average salary. Table 7.1 shows
the mean and median wages for three nationality groups.
Table 7.1.: Mean and Median of hourly Wages in Austria
Observations Mean Median (1) (2) (3)
Austrians 3,001 15.3067 13.4615 100,0 9.020 0.589
EU15 63 20.3935 18.4211 136,8 12.035 0,590
Immigrants 350 11.4706 10.6275 78.9 5.793 0,505
(1) in % of Austrian Median Wage (2) Standard Deviation (3) Variation Coefficient
(Sources: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
With EU-SILC 2005 a median wage gap for immigrants amounting to 21.1 percent
can be calculated. This result goes conform with Prettner/Stiglbauer (2007,
p. 57) who derive a wage gap of some 23 percent for Austrian immigrants with
Eurostat data. This means that full-time working persons, mainly from former
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Yugoslavia, Turkey and the new EU10 states, earn approximately 21 percent less
than natives. While the median wage gap among men amounts to 21.4 percent
(11.21 opposed to 14.26 euros), wages of foreign women are 20.2 percent below the
native ones (9.21 opposed to 11.54 euros).
Obviously immigrants from the old European Union earn substantially more
(+36%) than Austrians do, even though the sample with 63 observations is very
small. If we would take the EU15-wages as reference, the average wage of other
immigrants would only amount up to 58 percent. This can be explained by the
special role EU15 immigrants play on the Austrian labor market, as described in
Chapter 4. The absolute top earners are men from the EU15 with an average hourly
wage of 24.13 euros41. These are mainly graduates from universities working in large
companies with more than 50 employees.
Arbeitskra¨fte aus dem EWR sind vor allem im Kredit- und Bankensek-
tor, in Unterricht und Forschung sowie in unternehmensbezogenen Dien-
sten bescha¨ftigt. Personen aus dem fru¨heren Jugoslawien und der Tu¨rkei
arbeiten hingegen vor allem in Niedriglohnbranchen. (Biffl 2002, p. 540)
The coefficient of variation is simply the standard deviation divided by the mean.
For data that is closely bunched around the mean, the variation coefficient will be
small while the peak of the distribution will be high. Data that is more dispersed will
have a shorter peak and a higher variation coefficient. Hence, the smaller the coeffi-
cient of variation, the more equitable the distribution (cp. Hale 2003). According
to this measure of inequality, the immigrant wage structure is most equitable.
7.3. The unexplained part of the differential
As explained in Chapter 6 we start with a wage equation according to Mincer
(1974) and derive an ordinary least squares estimation over the whole sample on a
series of variables. As Nielsen et al. (2004) formulate in accurate words:
The first problem when dealing with wage decompositions is the choice
of which variables to include in the regressions. There are arguments for
41Note: The sample only contains 33 male persons from the EU15
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using the ”kitchen sink approach” (throwing into the regression every-
thing and its square, cube, etc.), but there are also arguments for using
mainly human capital variables. (Nielsen et al. 2004, p. 868)
The explanatory variables in this model are selected by statistical tests of signifi-
cance and are described in Section 5.3. The included ones are sex, highest completed
schooling career, firm size, residence (city or other agglomeration), labor market ex-
perience42, working in a skill-intensive sector and the parental education level as well
as a dummy for origin of birth. The endogenous variable is the logarithmic hourly
wage, the results are presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2.: Regression Results
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Sex -0.212∗∗∗ (0.019)
Secondary School 0.308∗∗∗ (0.024)
University 0.534∗∗∗ (0.031)
Agglomeration 0.083∗∗∗ (0.019)
Leading Position 0.190∗∗∗ (0.018)
Firm Size 0.054∗∗∗ (0.017)
Experience 0.041∗∗∗ (0.003)
Experience, squared -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Skilled Job 0.069∗∗∗ (0.019)
Parental Education 0.078∗∗ (0.032)
Foreigner -0.190∗∗∗ (0.029)
Intercept 1.882∗∗∗ (0.029)
N 3329
Adj. R2 0.337
F (12,3317) 154.92
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Some variables were removed from the calculations due to lack of significance, like
marital status. Married males are expected to have higher labor force participation
rates, to invest more in human capital and to have better health than singles (cp.
Chiswick 1978, p. 902). For the same age, schooling and place of residence, married
persons earn higher incomes. However, in these regressions this parameter was
42Labor market experience equals the number of employed years. The squared term is due to the
assumption that experience is a concave function, cp. Lemieux 2006
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excluded because of inadequate significance statistics. This was also necessary for
the job change and the worker’s health variables due to lack of explanatory power.
The F-Tests on the null hypothesis that the influence of these variables equals zero
could not be rejected in all cases.
The measure for the explanatory content Adj.R2 shows a value of 0.34 in Table
7.2. The studies cited in Section 3.4 offer a similar degree of explanation, with
adjusted R2 values that range between 0.30 and 0.38 units. Except for the parental
education all variables are significant on a one percent significance level. Foreign
origin and female sex have a negative impact on wages, which is indicated by the
minus sign. The biggest positive influence on income is given by a university degree,
a completed secondary school career or a leading function in an enterprise.
Table 7.3.: Regression Results by National-
ity
Variable Austrians Immigrants
Sex -0.206∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗
Secondary school 0.332∗∗∗ 0.081
University 0.556∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗
Agglomeration 0.072∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗
Leading Position 0.181∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
Firm size 0.057∗∗∗ 0.042
Experience 0.042∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
Experience sq. -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
Skilled Job 0.070∗∗∗ 0.043
Parental education 0.100∗∗∗ -0.124
Intercept 1.856∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗
N 2984 345
Adj. R2 0.348 0.159
F-Statistics 159.22 7.50
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
For checking the robustness of the regression we replace the actual experience
(i.e. the number of employed years) with a proxy for potential experience. We
calculate this variable simply by subtracting the age at the accomplishment of the
highest educational level from the actual age. In contrast to the actual experience
level there are no interruptions of the work life, like unemployment or child care,
included in the variable. As can be seen in the Appendix A.3 the results remain
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similar to our prior calculations. The correlation statistics are presented in Appendix
A.8.
On the basis of this regression a decomposition by origin of birth is derived, as
was suggested in Chapter 6.2. Due to the extraordinary role of working migrants
from the EU15, only the migrants from EU10 and Third States will be compared to
the Austrians. In Table 7.3 the regression is calculated for both nationality groups.
There are several differences between the two groups. For instance the gender
wage gap among Austrians is significantly smaller than among foreigners. Whereas
Austrian women earn 20.6 percent less, the difference in wages between men and
women among immigrants accounts up to 25.9 percent. While the graduation in a
secondary school does not seem to play a role, a leading position in the firm seems
to have a higher impact on wage determination for immigrants than for native
workers. The variable for parental education yields a strange result for foreigners,
but the variable is anyway below a sensible significance level. Next, the results of
the decomposition are illustrated in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4.: Decomposition of the Wage Regression
Mean high (H): 2.579
Mean low (L): 2.322
Raw differential (R) H-L: 0.257
- due to Endowments (E): 0.053
- due to Coefficients (C): 0.167
- Interaction term (CE): 0.037
D: 0 1 0.5 0.896 Pooled
Unexplained (U)(C+(1-D)CE): 0.204 0.167 0.185 0.171 0.157
Explained (V) (E+D*CE): 0.053 0.091 0.072 0.087 0.100
% unexplained (U/R): 79.3 64.8 66.3 68.3 61.0
% explained (V/R): 20.7 35.2 33.7 31.7 39.0
D in 4th column = relative frequency of high group; D in the 5th column = Neumark’s pooled model
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
On a first glance, the results of the decomposition are kind of sobering. Out of
a raw differential of 0.257 units, only 0.053 or 20.7 percent can be explained by
the characteristics included in the regression, if the native wage structure is taken
as reference group. However, if the immigrant wage structure is taken as the non-
discriminated group, the proportions shift to an explained fraction of 35.2 percent.
The third and the fourth columns represent the results of the models of Reimers
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(1983) and Cotton (1988), who proposed an equal distribution and a weighted
distribution by group size, respectively. In the pooled model of Neumark (1988)
the explained part of the wage differential can be increased to 39.0 percent and
the unexplained fraction shrinks to 61.0 percent respectively. Hence, far more than
half of the wage gap between immigrants and natives can not be explained with
the exogenous variables in use. It is now up to interpretations which fraction of
the unexplained part is due to insufficient information (lack of variables) and which
fraction can be referred to as discrimination.
For several reasons it is not plain sailing to equalize the unexplained part of the
earnings differential with discrimination, as Golder (2000, p. 4) explains. First,
productivity cannot entirely be measured by endowment characteristics. Second,
endowment disparities could at least partly be generated by pre-market discrimina-
tion, e.g. parents promoting more strongly the education of sons than of daughters.
Third, earnings discrimination could also be caused by labor market segregation.
Hence, the results should be treated cautious and these considerations should al-
ways be in mind.
Table 7.5.: Detailed Decomposition Results
E(D=0) C CE 1 0.5 0.896 Pooled
Sex 0.005 0.017 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
Secondary School 0.003 0.034 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.009
University 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.025 0.019 0.024 0.024
Agglomeration -0.038 -0.022 0.012 -0.025 -0.031 -0.027 -0.019
Leading Position 0.059 -0.023 -0.020 0.040 0.050 0.042 0.044
Firm Size -0.001 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
Experience 0.009 0.165 0.012 0.021 0.015 0.020 0.020
Skilled Job 0.005 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.010 0.014 0.017
Parental Education -0.003 0.015 0.006 0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.002
Intercept 0.000 -0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total 0.053 0.167 0.037 0.091 0.072 0.087 0.100
Columns 4-8: Explained fraction if D = ...
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
In Appendix A.4 the coefficients, means and predictions are presented. In Table
7.5 the influences of the single variables are divided in an explained and in an
unexplained fraction, respectively. As explained, the raw wage differential is the
difference between the mean wages of the two groups which amounts to 0.257 units.
As can be seen in the last row of Table 7.5, the raw differential may be split into
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an explained fraction E (endowments), an unexplained part C (coefficients) and an
interaction term CE. If the native wage structure is taken as reference group (D =
0), the endowment fraction of the wage differential will be 0.053, the unexplained
part will be 0.204 (0.167 + 0.037 = 0.204). Of course, both portions should sum up
to 0.257. In the Neumark pooled model, the explained fraction amounts to 0.100
units. In the table one can distinguish which variables have a positive, explanatory
impact and which ones reduce the portion of the endowment factor.
The most propulsive components in the explanatory fraction are a leading po-
sition, labor market experience and a university degree. These are the variables
that increase the wage gap between natives and immigrants due to differing human
capital endowments. Segregation, which is measured by high and low skilled sectors
respectively, widens the wage gap as well. Obviously the labor market experience
is playing a grave role in the decomposition. It accounts for 0.165 units on the un-
explained fraction. The impacts of missing characteristics, like post-school training
etc., are mixed up with discrimination in this variable, however, it is not statistically
definable to which extend real labor market discrimination affects the wage gap.
To sum up, it may be stated, that with the pooled decomposition model 39.0
percent of the wage gap between natives and immigrants can be explained by the
individual and structural characteristics included in the regression. The biggest
explanatory effect are delivered by the variables of a leading position, labor mar-
ket experience, a university degree and labor market segregation. The other 61.0
percent are attributed to the unexplained portion. This may be due to insufficient
information on endowments as well as pure labor market discrimination.
7.4. The Income Distribution
An interesting question is, whether the wage gap is equally distributed over the
whole income range. Therefore the earnings of natives and foreigners are split up in
deciles and the mean wages for all fractions are calculated. The wage gap measures
the difference in mean wages between natives and foreigners in a certain decile. The
results are presented in Figure 7.2.
The message of the wage gap curve is unambiguous: The wage gap increases
with rising incomes. While the differential amounts to 15.34 percent in the lowest
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Figure 7.2.: Mean wages and Wage gap by Deciles
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decile, where the mean wage of natives is 4.76 euros compared to 4.03 euros for
immigrants, the earnings differential surges to 28.49 percent in the top incomes
(34.02 euros compared to 24.33 euros). This could be seen as an indicator, that
immigrants either never reach high paid jobs or if they are employed in high paid
jobs, they receive substantially lower pay. As a side note it may be mentioned,
that earnings differentials in executive suits are the largest in the whole income
distribution.
There is obviously widespread inequality between natives and immigrants as far as
earnings are concerned. But how are earnings distributed within the both groups?
There are several measures of inequality that are traditionally promoted in the
literature. Allison (1978) and Hale (2003) give a good overview on the concepts
of measuring inequality. The 90/10 percentile and sum ratios are derived by dividing
the salary of the 90th percentile (or the sum of the highest decile respectively) with
the wage of the 10th percentile (or the sum of the lowest decile respectively). The
Gini coefficient is probably the most famous inequality measure and is given by the
formula
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G =
n∑
i=1
(2i− n− 1)x′i
n2µ
, (7.1)
where i is the individual’s rank order number, n is the number of total individuals,
x′i is the individual’s variable value, and µ is the population average. The Gini
coefficient equals 0 with perfect equality and 1 in complete inequality. The Atkinson
index is able to gauge movements in different segments of the income distribution.
To weigh different incomes a coefficient ε is introduced. The index becomes more
sensitive to changes at the lower end of the income distribution as ε approaches
1. Conversely, as the level of inequality aversion falls (that is, as ε approaches 0)
the index is more sensitive to changes in the upper end of the income distribution.
Hence, the formula yields
A =

1− 1
µ
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 y
1−ε
i
)1/(1−ε)
for ε ∈ [0, 1]
1− 1
µ
(∏N
i=1 yi
)1/N
for ε = 1,
(7.2)
where yi is individual income and µ is the mean income
43. The Theil index as well
equals zero for perfect equality. The particularity of this measure is that it may be
larger than 1. For example a Theil value of 2 represents a distribution where some
92% of the sample own 8% of total income and vice versa. A index of 4 means that
98% of the population own 2% of all resources, which of course is less equal than a
value of 2. The formula for Theil’s index denotes
T =

1
N
N∑
i=1
(
xi
x
· ln xi
x
)
for T1
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ln x
xi
)
for T0,
(7.3)
where xi is the income of person i. Finally, the McLoone Index is derived, which
is quite a simple measurement of inequality. It compares how much of a resource
is concentrated in the bottom half of a distribution to the median amount. The
McLoone index divides the sum of all observations at or below the median by the
43http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atkinson index
73
product of the number of observations at or below the median and the value of
the median itself. Unlike most inequality measures, a higher value for the McLoone
index describes a more equitable distribution. In Table 7.6 the results for the various
inequality measures are presented for natives and immigrants.
Table 7.6.: Inequality Measures
Measure Natives Foreigners More equal
90/10 percentile ratio 3.22579390 2.68058258 F
90/10 sum ratio 7.18065198 5.85118315 F
Gini coefficient 0.27639309 0.24151370 F
Atkinson (ε = 0) 0.06813524 0.05380379 F
Atkinson (ε = 1) 0.13923785 0.11162658 F
Theil (par=0) 0.13946317 0.10749832 F
Theil (par=1) 0.14993707 0.11836311 F
McLoone Index 0.72953225 0.73467795 F
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
As can be seen, the wage structure of immigrants is more equally distributed in
all of the measures, which is not very surprising, considering the range of native
incomes is much wider. For a graphical elaboration, the Lorenz curve is regarded as
the most proper way to illustrate income inequality. In Figure 7.3 a comparison of
the Lorenz curves natives and immigrants are shown.
The diagonal represents the perfectly equal distribution within a group. The more
the Lorenz curve approaches the diagonal, the more equality exists. As can be seen,
the curve of the immigrants confines a smaller area than the curve of natives. Hence,
the earnings of immigrants are distributed more equal.
7.5. The Austrian Tax System and Equality
Another interesting issue is the accuracy of the Austrian tax system on the income
distribution of the various nationality groups. The sample is analyzed on equal
distribution by means of the Gini coefficient. Table 7.7 lists all Gini coefficients for
gross and net annual incomes, as well as the margins.
74
Figure 7.3.: Comparison of Lorenz curves for Gross Annual Incomes
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Table 7.7.: Gini coefficients of Incomes before and after Taxation
Gross incomes Net incomes Difference in % Effective Progression
Austria 0.2763931 0.2437114 -11.82 1.045
EU15 0.2951052 0.2566992 -13.01 1.045
EU10 0.2492625 0.2493100 0.02 1.000
Fm. Yugoslavia 0.2418102 0.2103133 -13.03 1.042
Turkey 0.2295329 0.2081017 -9.34 1.028
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
The difference of Gini coefficients indicates that within the EU15 the biggest shift
in the equal distribution after the effect of taxation is taking place. The Gini coef-
ficient improves by approximately 13 percent. The incomes of EU15 migrants show
the biggest degree of inequality before and after taxation however. For immigrants
from the EU10, the Austrian tax system offers little accuracy, the Gini coefficient
remains without a change. Finally the effective progression of the Austrian taxa-
tion system can be calculated. Due to the progressive character of income taxes,
inequality will be reduced to a greater or lesser extend (which is curbed by the re-
gressive character of the social insurance contributions). This is what the effective
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progression measures by calculating rGini = (1 − Gnetto)/(1 − Gbrutto). As can be
seen in Table 7.7 the effects of taxation within employees from EU15 and Austria
are the largest.
The changes from gross to net earnings can also be illustrated in a frequency
distribution as it is shown in Figure 7.4 for Austria, EU15, EU10, former Yugoslavia
and Turkey.
Figure 7.4.: Frequency Distribution of Gross and Net Annual Incomes
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(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
The figure shows considerable effects of reallocation via taxation for all nationality
groups. Within the EU15 the effect is most obvious. While gross incomes are
scattered much more in the high income levels, a big adjustment to the left can
be noticed after taxation. The mean hourly wage drops from 20.4 euros pre-tax to
13.5 euros after tax. Furthermore the redistribution is noticeable within the group
of Austrians, the mean wage declines from 15.3 to 10.6 euros. The average annual
income of Yugoslavs and Turks falls from 11.2 pre-tax to 8.1 euros. The frequency
distribution for EU10 migrants has two peaks, whereof the first one indicates the
big frequency of people working below the minimum income limit for compulsory
social insurance or below the tax limit of 10,000 euros per annum. In general it
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may be pointed out that the incomes of migrants from the EU10, Yugoslavia and
Turkey are cumulated on the left border of the distribution which is related to a
higher representation in low wage sectors of the economy.
In terms of annual incomes, on average immigrants from the EU15 earn some
41,400 euros pre-tax and 27,400 euros after taxation. Salaries of natives are reduced
by taxes from 31,100 euros to 21,500 euros. The Austrian tax system also flattens
the wage structures of foreigners from EU10 (from 24,000 to 17,600 euros), former
Yugoslavia (from 22,800 to 16,700 euros) and Turkey (from 23,200 to 16,600 euros).
7.6. Citizenship or origin of birth?
In the EU-SILC dataset, 534 persons gave up their old citizenship and received the
Austrian citizenship. Most of them are from former Yugoslavia (168), EU10 (96),
EU15 (95) and Turkey (79). After correcting for retirees, half-time workers, etc. the
number of observations is reduced as can be seen in the last column of Table 7.8.
Table 7.8.: Mean Hourly Wages by Austrian Citizenship
without Austrian citizenship Obs. with Austrian citizenship Obs.
EU15 20.3935 63 16.6291 15
EU10 11.6597 49 12.3663 35
Fm. Yugoslavia 11.1934 179 12.7674 71
Turkey 11.1828 63 12.1210 36
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
The mean hourly wages of immigrants from EU10, former Yugoslavia and Turkey
are considerably higher if they are in possession of an Austrian citizenship. Turks
with the Austrian citizenship almost earn one euro more than their colleagues with-
out the certificate. The hourly mean income within Austro-Yugoslavs is some 1.5
euros above their counterparts’ earnings. If the variable of foreign origin is replaced
by citizenship in the regressions, the coefficient yields a value of −0.1573 compared
to −0.1889 from birthplace. A reason for the better performance of Austrian citizens
could be the assimilation thesis which is explained in Chapter 4.3. It is supposed
that only workers with long-term residence are willing or rather able to receive the
Austrian citizenship. In that period the acquisition of country-specific skills and
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knowledge as well as the language may be developed, which could lead to better
jobs and higher wages consequentially.
7.7. Do Immigrants face a higher Unemployment risk?
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Arai/Vilhelmsson (2001) analyzed the unemploy-
ment risk of immigrants compared to natives in 1991. They revealed that immigrants
from non-European countries run a risk of unemployment that is twice the corre-
sponding risk for native workers. As far as unemployment is concerned, EU-SILC
does not offer very detailed statistics. Variable p001000 surveys the actual state of
employment of the participant. The results are presented in Table 7.9.
It may be noticed, that Turkish immigrants face the highest probability of being
unemployed in a comparison with the employed population followed by immigrants
from former Yugoslavia44. Among Yugoslavs the ”unemployment rate” measured by
EU-SILC is approximately 13.1%, that of Turks some 16.7%. Thus, Turks face more
than the triple risk of Austrians of being unemployed in the data set. Using data
of the Statistik Austria, the unemployment rates for immigrants and native workers
can be calculated back to the year 1995. The results are presented in Figure 7.5 and
indicate higher unemployment rates for immigrants over the whole period.
Table 7.9.: Actual Employment Status by Origin of Birth
Austria EU15 EU10 Fm. Yugoslavia Turkey
Employed 4,333 81 72 259 80
(94.90) (94.19) (91.14) (86.91) (83.33)
Unemployed 233 5 7 39 16
(5.10) (5.81) (8.86) (13.09) (16.67)
Percentages in parenthesis
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
In 1995 the total unemployment rate amounted to 6.6%. While native workers
were faced with a rate of 6.4%, among immigrants the unemployment was substan-
tially higher with 7.7%. The peak of unemployment was in 2005 when 7.3% of the
labor force were without employment. 6.8% of Austrians were disengaged, but this
44Note: The percentages decline, when all other forms of activities (retirement, self-employment,
education, etc.) are included. The picture, however, remains the same.
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was true for 10.6% of immigrants. If the growth rates of unemployment in these
11 years are compared between natives and foreigners, Austrians were able to show
a better performance than foreigners eight times, and only three times foreigners
received better results. Hence, the volatility in employment of foreigerns exceeds
that of natives. This was discussed in Chapter 3.3. A fact that is remarkable is that
the share of Turks among unemployed foreigners has steadily decreased. While in
1993 the contingent of Turks accounted for 23.5% (6,374 out of 27,086), the share
shrinked to 18,4% (7,283 out of 39,563) in 2007. The portion of Yugoslavs nearly re-
maind stable. In 1993 42,5% of all unemployed immigrants were Yugoslavs (11,511)
and in 2007 their share amounted to 43.5% (17,209) in 2007. Considerably more un-
employed foreigners are contributed by Germany. While in 1993 some 1,200 persons
were affected (4,43%), the number increased to 3,409 in 2007 (8.62%).
Figure 7.5.: Unemployment Rates of Immigrants and Natives
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In Appendix B.1 the share of women within the group of unemployed is illustrated.
While the share of native women remains roughly stable over the whole period
between 1987 and 2007, more and more women can be found among the immigrant
unemployed. The share increased from 30.17% to 38.65% in these 20 years.
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7.8. The twofold Burden of Immigrant Women
The regression results have shown, that being a female worker reduces income sub-
stantially. Taking into account that native women receive lower pay than their male
counterparts, immigrant women are affected twice by income inequality - first as
women, second as foreigners. In Figure 7.6 the median wage gaps for origin of birth
and gender are illustrated. Since immigrants from EU15 earn higher incomes, the
ethnic wage gap for women and men are negative. However, the gender wage gap
within this group is the second highest of all nationalities with 25.9% less hourly
gross pay for women. According to the EU-SILC data, the gender wage differen-
tial of Austrians amounts to 19.1% and therefore is the smallest of all groups. The
worst situation may be attested for Turkish women. They receive 36.2% lower wages
compared to male Turks and 38.5% less than Austrian women. Most of them are
employed in low-paid social and personal service activities.
The results are consistent with Nielsen et al. (2004, p. 19), who state ”noting
that there is also a considerable gender wage gap among women, the combined effect
of gender and ethnicity puts immigrant women in a position, which is clearly worse
than their male counterparts”. If the results of the decomposition are regarded
again, 0.022 units from the raw differential of 0.257 resulted from the sex variable.
Thereof 0.005 can be explained by differences in endowments but 0.017 units of the
portion cannot be explained (cp. Table 7.5). Thus, obviously immigrant women are
concerned with heightened labor market discrimination.
7.9. Firm Size and Wages
Biffl (2002) states that the big part of foreign workers are employed in small
and middle-size enterprises. In 1999, 37.3 percent of foreigners and 32.4 percent of
natives worked in enterprises below 19 members of staff while only 8.8 percent of
the foreign labor force (but 21.6 percent of natives) worked in companies with more
than 1,000 workers. In the EU-SILC dataset this concrete hypothesis cannot be
confirmed for the year 2005 as can be seen in Table 7.10.
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Figure 7.6.: Ethnic and Gender Median Wage Gaps
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Table 7.10.: Enterprise Size and Nationality Concen-
tration
Enterprise Size
1-19 20-49 >50 1-19 20-49 >50
Absolute Numbers Percentage
Austrian 2372 784 1885 47 15 37
Turkey 35 9 39 42 11 47
fm. Yugoslavia 114 43 114 42 16 42
EU15 35 20 41 36 21 43
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
Obviously these outcomes don’t match with the results of Biﬄ. Even though it
seems right for companies between 11 and 19 workers. In such enterprises we only
find 10 percent of the native sample but 18 percent of Yugoslavs and 20 percent of
Turks. Nevertheless gaining access to large Austrian firms is a base for higher job
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security and smaller wage differentials, as income expectations rise with enterprise
size. Biffl (2002, p. 544) derives a simple wage regression on sex, age and enterprise
size which denotes lnwage = c+ β1 · sex+ β2 · age+ β3 · firmsize. Enterprise size,
to simplify matters, is just given by companies with more or less than 20 employees.
Table 7.11.: Wage Regression on Sex, Age and Firm size
β1 β2 β3 F-Test R2 Adj. R2
Austria -0.187 (0.000) 0.018 (0.000) 0.135 (0.000) 201.98 0.170 0.169
EU10 and third states -0.251 (0.000) 0.007 (0.004) 0.037 (0.527) 8.78 0.071 0.064
EU15 -0.254 (0.069) 0.018 (0.006) 0.296 (0.061) 6.50 0.252 0.213
T-value in parenthesis
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
As can be seen in Table 7.11, the results are not consistent with the outcome of
Biﬄ. While the coefficients for the age variable are negative in the paper of Biﬄ,
the coefficients in Table 7.11 show a positive sign, even though the effects are quite
small. Firm size seems to influence wages of natives and immigrants from EU15.
However, the value for immigrants from EU10 and Third States is insignificant on all
sensible levels. According to the simple regression, EU15-immigrants in enterprises
with more than 20 employees earn some 30% higher wages than workers in small
firms.
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8. Conclusions and Policy
Implications
Wie aber ”passen” Diskriminierung, Rassismus und Ungleichheit in die
Welt der Arbeit? Sind sie nicht notwendiges U¨bel oder gar bewusst
geschaffene Umsta¨nde wirtschaftlicher Interessen und Politiken, ohne die
die Arbeitswelt gar nicht zu denken wa¨re? Es stellt sich die Frage, ob
es u¨berhaupt einen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Willen gibt, struk-
turelle Diskriminierungen abzubauen. Denn dort, wo es eine diskrim-
inierte Gruppe gibt, findet sich auch immer eine Gruppe, die durchaus
von dieser Diskriminierung profitiert. (Manolakos 2006, p. 15)
The purpose of this work was to highlight the situation of a layer of society, that
often is referred to in a negative way in politics and economic debates. The economic
and social entity of Austrian immigrants is more or less blurred due to lack of re-
search and information. Many foreigners live under marginalized circumstances and
poor living conditions and have to face economic pressure on their wages and em-
ployment. The intention of this work was, to reveal some facts about the conditions
of immigrants and to offer a contribution for further discussion.
The results of this study are unambiguous: The median wage gap between Austri-
ans and foreigners from the ten new EU members as well as from former Yugoslavia
and Turkey accounts to some 21%. This may mainly be explained by differences
in education careers and occupational segregation (cp. Chapter 4). Nevertheless,
quite a big portion of the earnings differential could not be explained by the in-
cluded variables. Some 60% of the income disparity could not be explained by the
characteristics, and there is the justified assumption that a significant part of this
unexplained fraction emerges from labor market discrimination.
Another decisive result is that immigrants face multiple times higher unemploy-
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ment risks than natives do. For example Turks are more than three times as much
affected by unemployment as natives. Moreover, the employment fluctuation of for-
eigners combined with the business cycle is much higher than for Austrians. Hence,
immigrants from EU10, former Yugoslavia and Turkey form a layer of society that is
often referred to as industrial reserve army in sociological literature. They are hired
in periods of economic growth and dismissed at the first evidence of a cooling-down
of the economy. Finally, immigrant women are at the bottom of income distribu-
tion. They have to face doubled exploitation on the labor market. First, being
women, second being immigrants. They are not only affected by the ethnic wage
gap between natives and immigrants, but also by the internal gender wage gap for
each nationality.
All in all, immigrants have to face substantial disadvantages in Austria (if they are
not born in an old EU member state). Some of these disadvantages have structural
roots like laws, education systems, sector regimentations, etc. and others develop
with discrimination on the labor market and other social structures.
Most authors of studies on discrimination take labor market discrimination as a
given fact, solely investigating the consequences of prejudiced behavior. In Chapter
3 an extended perception of the conceptual framework was given. The intention is
to show, that economic discrimination has its historical roots in the formation of
class societies. The exploitation of one layer of society by another one is a decisive
fact in economics. Several authors, who are cited in this work, have stated that the
major profiteers of discrimination are employers, who benefit from wage competition
among workers and minimal wages for immigrants. Therefore this layer of society
will be interested in keeping up discrimination. Anti-discrimination proposals on a
political scale thus have always been (and will be) opposed by certain forces on a
parliamentary stage or any other policy-making board. Nevertheless these proposals
are very important to call public attention on economic discrimination of immigrants
and women, however a class society without exploitation is not conceivable. This
should be upfront in mind, while developing equality policies.
At the very least, workers should know that they have a legal right for equal
treatment in most countries, even though anti-discrimination proceedings are often
without any consequences. However, evidence suggests that public opinion is of-
ten ill-informed about such rights. Aside from Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Denmark and the United Kingdom, less than half of the population of European
countries knows that discriminating on the basis of gender or ethnic origin when hir-
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Figure 8.1.: Public awareness about legal anti-discrimination provisions
(Source: OECD 2008, p. 165)
ing new employees is unlawful, as is shown in Figure 8.1. According to the OECD,
public awareness of anti-discrimination provisions concerning ethnic origins tends to
be less than for gender (which could simply reflect the fact that the former targets
fewer people than the latter).
What are the proposals in regard of equality activities that arise in the litera-
ture? Manolakos (2006, p. 17) mentions mainly three approaches of corporate
equality policies: affirmative action, which emerged in the Afroamerican movement,
equal employment opportunities, which was developed in the context of gender dis-
crimination and diversity management, which is a corporate strategy linked to the
consultation of immigrant knowledge to maximize profits. In combination with these
strategies, the author mentions six levels of anti-discrimination activities: Training
the immigrants, making cultural allowances, challenging racist attitudes, combating
discrimination, equal opportunities policies with positive actions (so-called positive
discrimination) and diversity management. Other authors, like Brizic (2006), state
that the knowledge of foreign language should be seen as a chance and resource, but
these concepts are quite vague.
Nevertheless there are also some detailed transitional demands in public atten-
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tion. For example the creation of a minimum wage to combat low-pay sectors and
dumping-wages. The amount which is most often mentioned amounts to 60% of the
median wage. This should also be implemented on precarious employment, since
in this sector most of the affected workers are active. Another demand to reduce
unemployment could be the reduction of working time with entire wage adjustment.
This would mean to split up all necessary and existing tasks in a society on all
individuals who are capable of work.
But all of these well-intentioned policies leave open the question of feasibility.
Which social force may be able to carry out all the proposals and policies? Naturally
the only layer of society that is willing to fight discrimination will be the one that is
affected by it. Hence, unsurprisingly most of the mentioned demands are traditional
postulations of European unions and of the international labor movement.
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A. Appendix - Tables
Table A.1.: Balance of Trade with the new EU10 in Million Euro
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Estonia 35.770 47.432 208.332 67.741 96.227
Latvia 57.909 66.472 86.791 137.549 166.718
Lithuania 81.591 71.832 115.521 104.568 113.952
Malta 11.756 10.700 20.130 204.183 23.675
Poland 355.389 518.656 401.846 775.687 1.114.030
Slovakia -234.046 -436.651 -56.278 -20.523 -262.189
Slovenia 672.102 830.272 812.328 853.595 1.236.831
Czech Republic -220.661 -134.371 -263.755 29.901 364.412
Hungary 547.437 735.224 758.896 920.615 1.170.863
Cyprus 43.310 30.290 32.069 42.326 48.498
EU 10 1.350.557 1.739.856 2.115.880 3.115.642 4.073.017
(Source: Statistik Austria)
Table A.2.: Datasets for the Analysis of Income Inequality
Dataset Size Advantage of data Disadvantage of data
Statistics of the Austria
Social Insurance Sys-
tem (Hauptverband der
O¨sterreichischen Sozialver-
sicherung)
All persons liable to compul-
sory insurance deductions
time series up to the 1970ies No persons neither below
minimum income limit for
compulsory social insurance
nor above the maximum con-
tribution; lack of many im-
portant variables
Income Tax Data (Lohns-
teuerstatistik)
All income taxpayers (work-
ers, retirees)
long-term times series; bet-
ter and more detailed cover-
age of high incomes
Lower income partly over-
rated (persons who are not
continously employed); lack
of many important variables
Austrian Microcensus (La-
bor Force Survey, etc.)
Sample Many variables (working
time, educational level,
overtime work, etc.)
Data collected by poll
(sampling- and non-sampling
errors); hardly available
EU-SILC 2005 (former
ECHP)
Sample Many variables (working
time, educational level,
overtime work, etc.); harmo-
nized in the whole European
Union; better available than
microcensus
Data collected by poll
(sampling- and non-sampling
errors)
(Source: Zwickl 2008)
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Table A.3.: Robustness Check
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Sex -0.252∗∗∗ (0.019)
Secondary School 0.271∗∗∗ (0.024)
University 0.527∗∗∗ (0.031)
Agglomeration 0.078∗∗∗ (0.020)
Leading Position 0.223∗∗∗ (0.018)
Firm Size 0.067∗∗∗ (0.017)
Potential Experience 0.011∗∗∗ (0.001)
Skilled Job 0.082∗∗∗ (0.019)
Parental Education 0.085∗∗∗ (0.033)
Foreigner -0.219∗∗∗ (0.030)
Intercept 2.144∗∗∗ (0.022)
N 3351
Adj. R2 0.297
F (11,3340) 142.58
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.4.: Coefficients, Means and Predictions of the Decomposition
High model Low model Pooled
Coef. Mean Pred. Coef. Mean Pred. Coef.
Sex -0.205 0.318 -0.065 -0.256 0.339 -0.087 -0.211
Secondary School 0.331 0.177 0.059 0.100 0.148 0.015 0.310
University 0.561 0.114 0.064 0.300 0.070 0.021 0.545
Agglomeration 0.074 0.267 0.020 0.110 0.609 0.067 0.055
Leading Position 0.195 0.448 0.087 0.290 0.243 0.071 0.214
Firm Size 0.065 0.471 0.031 0.042 0.496 0.021 0.062
Experience 0.015 19.991 0.307 0.007 18.626 0.121 0.015
Skilled Job 0.077 0.444 0.034 0.028 0.252 0.007 0.087
Parental Education 0.107 0.085 0.009 -0.137 0.061 -0.008 0.087
Intercept 2.034 1.000 2.034 2.094 1.000 2.094 2.034
Total 2.579 2.322
Prediction = Coefficient * Mean
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
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Table A.5.: Sectors, Median and Foreigner Share
O¨NACE Median Wage in % (1) Total employees Foreigners In % Skill
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.63 28,358 8942 31.53 L
Mining and quarrying 1.38 12,864 860 6.69 L
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 0.89 72,121 12,948 17.95 L
Manufacture of textiles and textile products 0.87 22,174 5,111 23.05 L
Manufacture of leather and leather products 0.75 4,958 1,215 24.51 L
Manufacture of wood and wood products 1.02 35,217 4,431 12.58 L
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 1.35 42,162 3,745 8.88 L
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2.10 1,979 128 6.47 H
Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers 1.39 32,302 3,151 9.75 L
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1.14 25,394 4,420 17.41 L
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1.22 28,945 3,776 13.05 L
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 1.25 111,877 15,299 13.67 L
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.33 74,502 7,201 9.67 H
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 1.32 63,795 5,991 9.39 H
Manufacture of transport equipment 1.31 36,074 4,456 12.35 L
Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.95 37,323 3,992 10.70 L
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.70 23,587 460 1.95 H
Construction 1.11 247,441 47,424 19.17 L
Wholesale and retail trade 0.88 524,463 62,222 11.86 L
Hotels and restaurants 0.68 168,924 57,836 34.24 L
Transport, storage and communication 1.01 219,439 26,611 12.13 H
Financial intermediation 1.47 110,909 5,005 4.51 H
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.92 348,923 67,358 19.30 H
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 1.03 463,461 14,292 3.08 H
Education 0.92 149,537 8,310 5.56 H
Health and social work 0.84 297,207 30,032 10.10 L
Other community, social and personal service activities 0.80 37,423 6,111 16.33 L
Activities of households 0.48 3,382 778 23.00 L
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 1.19 2,714 349 12.86 H
(1) Compared to the median wage of overall economy
(Source: Statistik Austria, Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz: www.dnet.at/bali/, own calculations)89
Table A.6.: The Index-Number Problem
(Y¯ N − Y¯ F )−∑j βFj (X¯Nj − X¯Fj ) = βN0 − βF0 +∑j X¯Fj (βNj − βFj ) +∑j(X¯Nj − X¯Fj ) · (βNj − βj)
if βj = βNj ⇒
∑
j(X¯
N
j − X¯Fj ) · (βNj − βNj ) = 0
(Y¯ N − Y¯ F ) = βN0 − βF0 +
∑
j X¯
F
j (β
N
j − βFj ) +
∑
j β
F
j (X¯
N
j − X¯Fj )
if βj = βFj ⇒
∑
j(X¯
N
j − X¯Fj ) · (βNj − βj) =
∑
j(X¯
N
j − X¯Fj ) · (βNj − βFj )
(Y¯ N − Y¯ F ) = βN0 − βF0 +
∑
j X¯
F
j (β
N
j − βFj ) +
∑
j β
N
j (X¯
N
j − X¯Fj )
if βj = (βNj · 0.5 + βFj · 0.5) ⇒
∑
j(X¯
N
j − X¯Fj ) · (βNj − βj) =
∑
j β
N
j (X¯
N
j −X¯Fj )
2 +
∑
j β
F
j (X¯
N
j −X¯Fj )
2
(Y¯ N − Y¯ F ) = βN0 − βF0 +
∑
j X¯
F
j (β
N
j − βFj ) +
∑
j β
N
j (X¯
N
j −X¯Fj )
2 +
∑
j β
F
j (X¯
N
j −X¯Fj )
2
Table A.7.: R-Code for the Computation of the Decomposition-Model
daten=read.csv(”EU-Silc foreigner.csv”)
attach(daten)
dim(daten)
Generate a subset out of EU-Silc data with items lnwage, age, foreigner
regdata = subset(daten, ,c(lnwage, age, foreigner))
Exclude all the missing values
regdata = na.exclude(regdata)
dim(regdata)
Entitle the items and attach the names to the columns
names(regdata) = c(”lohn”, ”alter”, ”ausl”)
attach(regdata)
Decompose wages and age by the dummy foreigners
lohnausl = lohn[ausl == ”1”]; length(lohnausl)
lohnaust = lohn[ausl == ”0”]; length(lohnaust)
class(alter)
alter = as.numeric(alter)
alterausl = alter[ausl == ”1”]
alteraust = alter[ausl == ”0”]
Compute the means of age for both groups
xL = mean(alterausl)
xH = mean(alteraust)
Regression for both groups and entitle the coefficients and the intercepts
regausl = lm(lohnausl ∼ alterausl); regausl
b0L = coef(regausl) [1]
bL = coef(regausl) [2]
regaust = lm(lohnaust ∼ alteraust); regaust
b0H = coef(regaust) [1]
bH = coef(regaust) [2]
Compute the terms of the Blinder wage decomposition
E = bH*(xH - xL)
C = xL*(bH - bL)
U = b0H-b0L
R = E + C + U
D = C + U
Offer an output of the main results of the wage decomposition
decomp = data.frame(E, C, U, R, D)
names(decomp) = c(”Endow.”, ”Coeff.”, ”Shift”, ”Raw”, ”Discr.”)
decomp
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Table A.8.: Correlation Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Wage (1) 1.0000
Sex (2) -0.1890 1.0000
Secondary School (3) 0.1498 0.0701 1.0000
University (4) 0.2974 0.0621 -0.1612 1.0000
Agglomeration (5) 0.1077 0.0914 0.0834 0.1538 1.0000
Leading Pos. (6) 0.3225 -0.1107 0.1208 0.1714 0.0327 1.0000
Firm Size (7) 0.1007 -0.0984 0.0295 0.0025 0.0983 0.0386 1.0000
Experience (8) 0.2898 -0.1628 -0.1201 -0.0503 -0.0120 0.1319 0.0458 1.0000
Skilled Job (9) 0.2051 0.1353 0.1763 0.2747 0.1091 0.1257 0.0170 0.0344 1.0000
Parental Ed. (10) 0.1784 -0.0009 0.0974 0.2676 0.1219 0.1348 0.0380 0.0085 0.1255 1.0000
Foreigner (11) -0.1316 0.0138 -0.0237 -0.0436 0.2264 -0.1261 0.0153 -0.0375 -0.1183 -0.0272 1.0000
(Source: EU-SILC 2005, own calculations)
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B. Appendix - Figures
Figure B.1.: Share of Women within the Group of Unemployed
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(Source: Statistik Austria, own illustration)
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Figure B.2.: Share of Persons with University degree or higher graduation
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